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Abstract
For over a decade, women seeking asylum from persecution inflicted by their abusive husbands and partners
have found little protection in the United States. During that time, domestic violence-based asylum cases have
languished in limbo, been denied, or occasionally been granted in unpublished opinions that have not
provided a much-needed adjudicative standard. The main case setting forth the pre-Obama approach to
domestic violence-based asylum is rife with misunderstanding of the nature of domestic violence and
minimization of the role that society plays in the proliferation of domestic violence. Fortunately, however, a
recent Obama-administration legal brief indicates that women fleeing countries where governments are
unable or unwilling to protect them from their abusive husbands finally may be able to avail themselves of U.S.
asylum law. This article proposes a workable standard for adjudicating such claims. Based in part on
psychological research on the dynamics of abusive relationships, particularly the phenomenon known as
“separation violence,” this article formulates a particular social group that satisfies the various legal elements
for political asylum: “women who have left severely abusive relationships.” This social group is based on
research demonstrating that abusers strike out with increased violence when their partners leave the
relationships, in many cases even killing them. This article explores the dynamics of abusive relationships, the
failure of U.S. adjudicators to understand those dynamics, and the application of international human rights
law to domestic violence survivors.
Keywords
Refugee, Asylum, Domestic violence, Intimate partner violence, Battered women, International law,
Immigration law, Persecution
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INTRODUCTION 
Maria Elena fears for her life.  For years she has lived under the 
rule of a despot intent on maintaining absolute control of his realm.  
As a member of a historically oppressed tribe with few political rights, 
Maria Elena is a prime target for the dictator’s calculated methods of 
maintaining control.  He has randomly imprisoned, tortured, beaten, 
and threatened to kill Maria Elena over a period of several years.  The 
torture is worse when Maria Elena takes any action that challenges 
the despot’s absolute authority.  Maria Elena tried to flee once, but 
people with whom she sought shelter turned out to be agents of the 
despot and alerted him to her whereabouts.  When he found her, he 
nearly killed her.  Maria Elena has now accepted the reality that there 
is no safe place for her in her country.  She has left her children with 
her parents and is going to flee to the United States. 
In this scenario, the classic refugee described above would apply 
for refugee protection in the form of asylum after reaching safety in 
the United States.  She would claim asylum on the basis that she fears 
persecution in the form of torture and possible death.  There would 
be little question as to the basis of her claim.  Research on the 
country and its tyrannical ruler would clearly document the abuses 
suffered by members of Maria Elena’s tribe, particularly when those 
members had challenged the ruler’s authority.  If she were credible, 
and if she met her burden of proof, the United States, a country of 
refuge, would welcome Maria Elena with open arms. 
Maria Elena, however, is not a classic refugee.  The tyrant is her 
husband.  His realm is their home.  Her tribe consists of women in 
general, and more particularly, women with whom her husband is in 
a relationship.  The agents who sent her back to him are his family, 
her family, or members of her government who are unable or 
unwilling to issue or enforce a protective order.  The beatings, 
torture, and threats against her life are the same, as is the reason for 
the abuse:  the retention of absolute power.  Nevertheless, it is likely 
that Maria Elena will not be entitled to the same protection as the 
classic refugee. 
  
340 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:337 
 
In 1999, the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”) held in 
Matter of R-A-1 that a woman who had fled severe domestic violence 
did not qualify as a refugee, and was thus ineligible for asylum 
protection in the United States.  The basis for the Board’s denial of 
asylum was that the applicant, a Guatemalan national named Rodi 
Alvarado, could not prove that the persecution she suffered occurred 
on account of one of the five protected grounds listed in the  
refugee definition:  race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group.2  Alvarado argued that  
“her husband necessarily imputed to her the view that she believed 
women should not be controlled and dominated by men.”3  She also 
argued that she was a member of a particular social group consisting 
of “Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with 
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live 
under male domination.”4  Nevertheless, the Board decided that 
Alvarado had failed to establish that her husband persecuted her  
“on account of . . . [her] political opinion or [her] membership in a 
particular social group.”5 
Despite this ruling in Matter of R-A-, people fleeing domestic 
violence have continued to apply for asylum, sometimes successfully.6  
                                                          
 1. 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999), vacated and remanded to stay reconsideration 
(A.G. 2001), remanded for reconsideration 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), lifted stay and 
remanded for reconsideration 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008). 
 2. Id. at 912, 914 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994)). 
 3. Id. at 916. 
 4. Id. at 911. 
 5. Id. at 914. 
 6. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 947 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting 
that an immigration judge granted asylum to Rosa Gutierrez, a defendant in a Hague 
Convention case, on June 25, 2002, “on the basis of her status as a victim of domestic 
violence”).  In a subsequent, unpublished California Court of Appeals case, Gonzalez 
v. Gutierrez, the court noted that Ms. Gutierrez was granted asylum based on her 
membership in the particular social group, “Mexican women who have suffered 
domestic violence,” and that the grant of asylum became final when Immigration 
and Naturalization Service withdrew its appeal on December 18, 2002.  No. D040063, 
2003 WL 22236051, *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2003); see also Aguirre-Cervantes v. 
INS, 242 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001) (granting asylum to a Mexican child who had 
suffered physical abuse at the hands of her father on account of her membership in 
the social group of her nuclear family); Matter of S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328  
(BIA 2000) (granting asylum to a woman who suffered physical abuse at the hands of 
her orthodox Muslim father on account of her liberal Muslim beliefs); KAREN 
MUSALO, JENNIFER MOORE & RICHARD BOSWELL, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY:   
A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 817 (3d ed. 2007) (citing Matter of A-
N-, No. A73 506 840, Decision of the Court (Philadelphia Immigration Court,  
Dec. 22, 2000) (granting asylum to a Jordanian woman who feared persecution by 
her husband and his family)); id. (citing Matter of J-J-, Decision of the Court  
(York Immigration Court, Apr. 10, 2001) (granting asylum to a Spanish Roma 
woman who feared being returned “to an abusive marriage . . . by elders of the Roma 
ethnic community”)).  See generally Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Asylum for Victims 
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The agencies responsible for adjudicating asylum claims, the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, have struggled with how to adjudicate domestic violence-
based asylum claims.  For example, the Department of Justice stayed 
the Board’s ruling in Matter of R-A- and proposed regulations for 
adjudicating gender-based asylum claims.7  Attorneys for the 
Department of Homeland Security and attorneys for Alvarado  
re-briefed the case per the request of Attorney General John Ashcroft 
in 2004.8  In its new brief, the Department of Homeland Security 
conceded that Alvarado, because of her particular circumstances, 
qualified for asylum.9  Nevertheless, Alvarado still has not received a 
final grant of asylum, and the Department of Justice has still not 
issued final regulations governing the adjudication of gender-based 
asylum claims.10 
One of the obstacles preventing the resolution of Alvarado’s case 
and others like it is the lingering inability of U.S. jurists and 
policymakers to fully understand the nature of domestic violence.  
The Board’s majority opinion in Matter of R-A- and its proposed 
regulations demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of a 
number of factors pertaining to domestic violence—factors involving 
psychology, economics, culture, law, and philosophy.  One of the 
most glaring misunderstandings concerns the psychology of domestic 
violence, especially the theory of separation violence.11 
                                                          
of Gender Violence:  An Overview of the Law, and an Analysis of 45 Unpublished Decisions, 
2003 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (2003) (conducting a study on the impact of Matter of R-A- 
on women’s claims before the Board and individual immigration judges and 
concluding that some adjudicators view the vacation of the decision as broadening 
the possibilities for gender-related claims). 
 7. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,588–98 
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
 8. Matter of R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanding for reconsideration 22 
I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001) & 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999).  Attorney General 
Ashcroft’s decision remanded the case to the Board and required the Board to 
postpone hearing the case until the final version of the proposed regulations were 
published.  Id. 
 9. See Department of Homeland Security’s Position on Resp’t’s Eligibility for 
Relief at 2, Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA Feb. 19, 2004) [hereinafter “DHS 
Brief 2004”] (arguing that “under some limited circumstances a victim of domestic 
violence can establish eligibility for asylum on this basis, and that the applicant in this 
case has established such eligibility”). 
 10. Matter of R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008), lifting stay imposed in 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanding for reconsideration 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001) 
& 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999).  Attorney General Mukasey’s decision lifted the 
stay that required the Board to await publication of the final regulations.  Id. at 630–
31. 
 11. See infra notes 57–75 and accompanying text (explaining the phenomenon 
known as “separation violence”). 
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In the scenario described above, Maria Elena suffered the worst 
abuse when she tried to flee the country and was then caught.   
By leaving the relationship, the battered woman is engaging in the 
ultimate challenge to her abuser’s power, authority, and control.  She 
is, in effect, pulling the trigger by committing an act that she cannot 
take back.  Regardless of whether the abuser forces her to return or 
whether she returns on her own, the abuser now knows that she is 
capable of leaving him, and he escalates his abuse in order to punish 
her for her challenge to his authority and to ensure that such a 
challenge does not happen again.12 
An understanding of the theory of separation violence is crucial to 
any legal analysis of a battered woman’s claim for refugee protection.  
The Board declined to grant Alvarado’s claim because the Board 
failed to see a nexus between the abuse that Alvarado suffered and 
her membership in a particular social group.13  Part of the basis for 
this failure was the Board’s perception that Alvarado’s situation was a 
random, private one, characterized by bad luck and a poor choice of 
spouse on her part.14  This perception is evidence of the Board’s 
ignorance of the psychology of domestic violence, particularly the 
effects of leaving an abusive relationship.  Had the Board been aware 
of the theory of separation violence, and had it understood the 
theory’s statistically based underpinnings, it would have identified 
Alvarado’s fear of future persecution as having developed on account 
                                                          
 12. See Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants:  
A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 217, 258 (2003) (“Not only can fleeing 
fail to stop the criminal behavior, it may incite an escalation of the violence, 
sometimes even leading to murder of the battered partner.”). 
 13. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 920–23 (BIA 1999), vacated and remanded 
to stay reconsideration (A.G. 2001), remanded for reconsideration 23 I. & N. Dec. 694  
(A.G. 2005), lifted stay and remanded for reconsideration 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008). 
 14. The Board recounted the testimony of Dr. Bersing, an expert on the 
conditions of Rodi Alvarado’s native country of Guatemala, as follows: 
[Dr. Bersing] testified that husbands are supposed to honor, respect, and 
take care of their wives, and that spouse abuse is something that is present 
“underground” or “underneath in the culture.”  But if a woman chooses the 
wrong husband her options are few in countries such as Guatemala, which 
lack effective methods for dealing with the problem. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
[T]he arbitrary nature of the attacks further suggests it was not the 
respondent’s claimed social group characteristics that he sought to 
overcome.  The record indicates that there is nothing the respondent could 
have done to have satisfied her husband and prevented further abuse. 
Id. at 921. 
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of a clear, recognizable, and narrow social group:  “women who have 
left severely abusive relationships.”15 
This Article seeks to (1) explain that the persecution suffered by 
domestic violence victims is neither random, nor limited to the 
victims’ particular circumstances, and (2) demonstrate that a fuller 
understanding of the psychology of domestic violence—and the 
theory of separation violence in particular—provides a clear 
framework for finding that survivors of severe domestic violence are 
eligible for asylum.  Part I describes the psychology of domestic 
violence:  the Cycle of Violence that keeps battered women trapped 
in abusive relationships and the separation violence that is likely to 
occur after a battered woman leaves an abusive relationship.  Part II 
provides an overview of international refugee law and U.S. asylum 
law, and discusses the formulation of battered women’s asylum claims 
in the United States.  Part III explains and analyzes “membership in a 
particular social group,” one of the five grounds upon which an 
individual may seek asylum.  Part IV proposes a new social group 
upon which battered women may successfully claim asylum:  
membership in the particular social group of “women who have left 
severely abusive relationships.” 
I. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
This Article contends that domestic violence is a legitimate basis 
for refugee protection because the psychology of domestic violence 
                                                          
 15. The Authors of this Article acknowledge that battering occurs against men 
and that battering occurs in both homosexual and heterosexual relationships.  This 
Article, and the social group proposed in this Article, focus only on women for two 
reasons.  First, a 2003 study found that the vast majority of intimate partner 
violence—eighty-five percent—is committed against women.  Callie Marie Rennison, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
CRIME DATA BRIEF, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993–2001, at 1 (2003), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf.  The study also found that 
intimate partner violence comprised twenty percent of violence committed against 
women, whereas intimate partner violence comprised only three percent of violence 
committed against men.  Id.; see also Ronet Bachman, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN:  A NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REPORT 6 (1994) (finding that 
women experienced ten times as many incidents of violence by an intimate partner 
than did men, and that most acts of spousal abuse are repeated an average of six 
times a year and escalate in severity and intensity over time).  Second, the domestic 
violence addressed in this Article—that which occurs against women in countries 
where governments are unable or unwilling to protect domestic violence victims— 
is virtually inextricable from patriarchal notions of male domination over women.  
See R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES:  A CASE AGAINST 
THE PATRIARCHY 24 (1979) (discussing how “men who assault their wives are actually 
living up to cultural prescriptions that are cherished in Western society—
aggressiveness, male dominance, and female subordination”). 
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reveals that batterers neither choose nor abuse their victims at 
random.  This Part first discusses Dr. Lenore Walker’s identification 
of the “Cycle of Violence” that occurs in domestic abuse relationships 
in order to demonstrate that abusers are motivated by a need to 
obtain dominance and control similar to the dominance and control 
exhibited in more traditional refugee cases, such as the oppressive 
dictator seeking to dominate and control the citizens of a country.  
This Part then explains that because abusers act within the privacy of 
their homes rather than within the public sphere, as classic despots 
act, they target their victims differently, but with no more or less 
randomness than a despot’s security forces target perceived and 
actual dissidents.  Finally, this Part addresses the theory of “separation 
violence,” which explains why the risk of violence and death increases 
exponentially when an individual flees an abusive relationship. 
A. Definition of Terms 
According to the Department of Justice’s Office on Violence 
Against Women, domestic violence is “a pattern of abusive behavior 
in any relationship that is used by one partner to gain or maintain 
power and control over another intimate partner.”16  The Department 
of Justice further explains that “[d]omestic violence [includes] 
physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological actions or 
threats of actions that influence another person.”17  Physical abuse is 
invariably coupled with nonphysical abuse, including verbal acts of 
intimidation, manipulation, humiliation, isolation, and coercion 
toward the victim, economic exploitation, and terrorizing behaviors.18  
As the term is used in this Article, the term “domestic violence” refers 
to physical and nonphysical abuse that rises to the level of 
persecution.  Generally, the term “persecution” refers to severe abuse 
that threatens an individual’s life or well-being.19 
                                                          
 16. U.S. Department of Justice, Office on Violence Against Women:  About 
Domestic Violence, http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 
2009). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not define the term 
“persecution.”  Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at  
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006)).  Its definition has been left to court interpretation.  
See, e.g., Torres v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2008) (defining persecution 
as acts that “rise above mere harassment,” such as “detention, arrest, interrogation, 
prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, 
beatings, or torture” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Eta-Ndu v. Gonzales,  
411 F.3d 977, 983 (8th Cir. 2005) (defining persecution as harm “involv[ing] a threat 
to one’s life or freedom” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lie v. Ashcroft,  
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Physical abuse is “any behavior that involves the intentional use of 
one’s body against the body of another person in such a way that 
there is risk of physical injury, regardless of whether the behavior 
results in actual injury.”20  Some examples of physical abuse include 
“hitting, pushing, shoving, punching, pounding, slapping, or [using] 
a weapon or object to injure.”21 
Psychological abuse by itself can also be an insidious form of abuse.  
It is often difficult to detect, but can be even more difficult for the 
woman to bear than the physical abuse.22  Such abuse includes:  
taunts; verbal put-downs of the victim’s appearance, intelligence, or 
competence as a wife, lover, or mother; threats of harm; and other 
degrading language.23 
B. Understanding the “Cycle of Violence”:  Dr. Lenore Walker’s 
Groundbreaking Work 
Dr. Lenore Walker was the first scholar to identify the “battering 
cycle,”24 now commonly known as the “Cycle of Violence.”  Dr. Walker 
theorizes that it is a misconception that battered women are abused 
constantly, or abused totally at random; instead, she suggests that 
there is a distinguishable cycle of violence.25  Dr. Walker’s research 
reveals that most battered women experience a similar cycle of 
violence even though the women have distinct relationships.26  This 
cycle is critical to understanding patterns that occur within violent 
relationships and the reasons why battered women so often remain 
in, or return to, their abusive relationships.27 
                                                          
396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005) (defining persecution as “threats to life, 
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a 
threat to life or freedom”); Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 647 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(defining persecution as “the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who  
differ . . . in a way regarded as offensive” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 20. MARY ANN DUTTON, EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BATTERED WOMAN 22 
(1992). 
 21. Id. 
 22. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 59 (1979) [hereinafter WALKER, 
BATTERED WOMAN].  See generally LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE (1989) 
[hereinafter WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE] (discussing her interviews with battered 
women and her finding that psychological abuse through attacks on self-esteem had 
the most hurtful and debilitating effects). 
 23. DUTTON, supra note 20, at 25–27. 
 24. WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 22, at 55. 
 25.  Id. 
 26. See WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 22, at 42 (reporting that, even 
though the “Cycle of Violence” does not occur in all abusive relationships, it did 
occur in approximately two-thirds of the 1,600 incidents that Dr. Walker studied). 
 27. WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 22, at 55. 
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The Cycle of Violence has three distinct phases:  (1) the “tension-
building phase,” (2) the “explosion or acute battering incident,” and  
(3) the “calm, loving respite.”28  As discussed below, this cycle ensures 
that the abuser achieves and maintains his primary goal:  control over 
and domination of his spouse. 
1. Phase one:  tension-building 
The tension-building phase is characterized by an environment in 
which the woman feels the need to walk on eggshells.29  As Dr. Walker 
describes, the woman “usually attempts to calm the batterer through 
the use of techniques that have proved previously successful.”30  She 
may “become nurturing [or] compliant,”31 anticipating his moods, or 
she may attempt to avoid him.32  Despite her attempts, the batterer 
may engage in “minor battering incidents.”33 
During this phase, the woman tends to conceal or deny her own 
anger toward the abuser and feels responsible for any abuse that 
occurs.34  She will “often identify[] with the batterer’s faulty 
reasoning” for the battering, and she may begin to “rationalize[] that 
perhaps she did deserve the abuse.”35  At other times, she may 
minimize the abuse and blame it on the situation, stress, or alcohol 
and drug abuse.36 
The tension-building phase may continue at a constant level for 
months or years because neither partner wants the next phase—the 
acute battering phase—to occur.37  In order to prevent the situation 
from escalating into the next phase, the woman may endeavor  
“to control as many external factors as possible” and to conceal the 
abusive behavior from family and friends.38 
Despite the efforts to avoid a battering incident, however, the 
situation begins to spiral out of control.  The abuser’s verbal 
humiliation and abuse increase along with his physical abuse.39   
                                                          
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 56–59. 
 30. Id. at 56. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 56–57. 
 34. Id. at 56. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 56–57. 
 37. See id. at 58 (describing a situation in which ten years passed before the 
batterer returned to the acute battering phase because the couple’s child was killed 
in a car accident). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 59. 
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As the woman becomes exhausted from her efforts to deny her anger 
and prevent further abuse, she becomes more fragile and tends to 
withdraw.40  As the abuser senses her withdrawal, he becomes more 
anxious, and “[t]ension between the two becomes unbearable.”41   
At the end of the tension-building phase, control is lost, and the 
second phase begins. 
2. Phase two:  acute battering 
The acute battering phase is the culmination of the tension that 
has been building during the first phase.42  Sometimes the woman 
herself provokes the attack because she can no longer endure what 
Dr. Walker describes as “her terror, her anger, or anxiety.”43  The 
battering that occurs during this phase is distinguishable from the 
minor battering that may have occurred during the first phase 
because of the batterer’s increased rage, destructiveness, and 
intensity.44 
Even after the abuse occurs, the acute battering phase may not be 
entirely over.45  Women often delay seeking help immediately after 
the acute battering because they fear further battering.46  Dr. Walker 
explains that “the battered woman knows that when the police leave 
she will be left alone with the batterer again, and she is terrified of 
being further abused.”47 
3. Phase three:  calm respite 
The post-battering calm respite “is characterized by extremely 
loving, kind, and contrite behavior by the batterer.”48  The tension 
and abuse from the first and second phases have disappeared, and 
the abuser enters a period of contrition and remorse.49  However, it is 
important to note that the abuser also believes that the woman has 
                                                          
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 60–61.  Dr. Walker lists some of the “psychophysiological symptoms” 
that battered women experience:  “sleepless nights, loss of appetite, . . . overeating, 
oversleeping, and constant fatigue” as well as “tension headaches, stomach ailments, 
high blood pressure, allergic skin reactions, and heart palpitations.”  Id. at 61. 
 44. Id. at 59–60. 
 45. Id. at 60 (noting that the battering phase “lasts from two to twenty-four hours, 
although some women have reported a steady reign of terror for a week or more”). 
 46. Id. at 64–65. 
 47. Id. at 65. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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learned her lesson and will never “provoke” him again.50  The calm 
respite is the point in an abusive relationship that makes leaving so 
difficult.51  The batterer’s kindness, love, and sometimes his genuine 
interest in reforming during this phase support her belief that he will 
never batter her again.52  He—and his family and friends—will also 
remind her of how much he needs her and how hurt he will be if she 
leaves.53  After the calm respite, however, the relationship inevitably 
cycles back to the tension-building phase, and the acute battering 
phase will follow unless the woman can manage to break the Cycle of 
Violence.54 
Breaking the Cycle of Violence is an extremely difficult endeavor.55  
Severe physical, sexual, and emotional abuse, lack of self-esteem, 
financial interdependency, guilt, family obligations, societal or 
cultural factors, the abuser’s relentless quest for control, and the 
victim’s hope for change are all interwoven into the abusive 
relationship, creating a virtual prison from which escape is difficult at 
best, and deadly at worst.56 
C. Separation Violence 
It is a common misperception that leaving the abusive relationship 
will result in increased safety for the victim.  Empirical research 
shows, however, that a woman is at greater risk of injury or death 
when she leaves an abusive relationship.57  Thus, even when a woman 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 65−66.  Dr. Walker also notes that although it was the batterer who was 
at fault for the abuse, he makes the woman feel guilty and responsible during the 
honeymoon phase.  Id. at 66–67. 
 51. See id. at 66−70. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 66–67. 
 54. Id. at 69–70. 
 55. Id. at 68–69. 
 56. Id. at 66–70. 
 57. See, e.g., Deborah K. Anderson & Daniel G. Saunders, Leaving an Abusive 
Partner:  An Empirical Review of Predictors, the Process of Leaving, and Psychological  
Well-Being, 4 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 163, 179 (2003) (reporting that twenty-four 
to thirty-five percent of women who leave abusive relationships experience more 
severe abuse after separation); Walter S. DeKeseredy, Separation/Divorce Sexual 
Assault, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 637, 637−38 (Claire M. 
Renzetti & Jeffrey L. Edleson eds., 2008) [hereinafter DeKeseredy, Sexual Assault] 
(“Other key findings include the fact that seventy-four percent of the sample were 
sexually abused when they expressed a desire to leave a relationship.”); Walter S. 
DeKeseredy et al., Separation/Divorce Sexual Assault:  The Contribution of Male Support,  
1 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 228, 237−38 (2006) (finding that married women 
experience more intense separation violence than women who were cohabitating 
with their batterers); Walter S. DeKeseredy, McKenzie Rogness & Martin D. Schwartz, 
Separation/Divorce Sexual Assault:  The Current State of Social Scientific Knowledge,  
9 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 675, 677−84 (2004) [hereinafter DeKeseredy, 
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is emotionally ready to leave an abusive relationship, the very real fear 
of escalated violence—commonly known as “separation violence”58—
or even death may prevent her from doing so.59 
In their 1993 study of spousal homicide, Margo Wilson and Martin 
Daly analyzed spousal homicide statistics from Canada, New South 
Wales (Australia), and Chicago.60  The statistical data showed that,  
in Canada and New South Wales, the number of wives killed by their 
husbands was approximately three times higher than the number of 
husbands killed by their wives.61  Those figures increased significantly 
when the partners were separated or divorced:  women were victims 
nine times more frequently than men in Canada, fifteen times more 
frequently in New South Wales, and nearly three times more 
frequently in Chicago.62  Based on their analysis of this data, Wilson 
and Daly arrived at the following conclusion: 
Recognizing that women incur risk of severe violence at separation 
necessitates action to guarantee their safety, but the coercive use of 
such violence and threats implies more.  Husbands threaten and 
use violence to constrain women’s options, and continued failure 
to attend to these utilitarian aspects of violence against wives 
constitutes a denial of women’s entitlement to autonomy.63 
Wilson and Daly found that “wives are much more likely to be slain 
by their husbands when separated from them than when  
co-residing.”64  This finding and other studies confirm that separation 
                                                          
Rogness & Schwartz, Scientific Knowledge] (reviewing studies of separation sexual 
assault, which all point to the conclusion that separation sexual assault poses a major 
risk to the health and safety of women trying to leave abusive relationships); Robert 
Walker, TK Logan, Carol E. Jordan & Jacquelyn C. Campbell, An Integrative Review of 
Separation in the Context of Victimization:  Consequences and Implications for Women,  
5 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 143, 158−60 (2004) (reporting that psychological abuse 
was experienced by ninety-five percent of women after separating from their abusive 
relationships while thirty-nine percent experienced continued physical abuse). 
 58. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:  Redefining the Issue of 
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (coining the term “separation assault” to 
define the higher rate of assault on women following separation from violent 
relationships). 
 59. See Anderson & Saunders, supra note 57, at 179 (noting that women who 
leave abusive relationships “are about 25 times more likely to be assaulted by  
ex-mates . . . and 5 times more likely to be murdered”). 
 60. Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Spousal Homicide Risk and Estrangement,  
8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 3, 5 (1993). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 7. 
 63. Id. at 13. 
 64. Id. at 8. 
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from the abusive relationship results in the woman’s increased risk of 
harm and even death.65 
Two dominant theories that seek to explain separation violence are 
Robert Borstein’s “dependency-possessiveness model”66 and Wilson 
and Daly’s theory of “male sexual proprietariness.”67  According to the 
dependency-possessiveness model, “the dependent person’s 
insecurity and abandonment fears may lead him to become abusive 
when he believes his partner will reject them.”68  Similarly, the theory 
                                                          
 65. See JUDITH A. ALLEN, SEX AND SECRETS:  CRIMES INVOLVING AUSTRALIAN WOMEN 
SINCE 1880, at 52 (1990) (stating that in late nineteenth-century Australia, nearly half 
of murders, manslaughters, or attempted murders committed by husbands against 
their wives took place while they were separated); ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED 
WOMEN KILL 73 (1987) (noting a study that showed that up to fifty percent of wives 
who left abusive husbands were found by their husbands and were terrorized or 
abused); PETER D. CHIMBOS, MARITAL VIOLENCE:  A STUDY OF INTERSPOUSE HOMICIDE 
47–48 (1978) (noting the results of a study in which sixty-five percent of the study 
participants, each of which had committed interspouse homicide, stated that they 
had separated from their spouse at least once); ALLISON WALLACE, HOMICIDE:   
THE SOCIAL REALITY 98 (1986) (stating that thirty-nine percent of male subjects in a 
study killed their wives while they were separated); MARGO WILSON & MARTIN DALY, 
HOMICIDE 196−98 (1988) [hereinafter WILSON & DALY, HOMICIDE] (explaining that 
when a wife leaves a relationship, her husband may feel jealous and may fear losing 
control over his wife’s reproductive ability, and that these feelings may lead to 
homicide); G.W. Barnard et al., Till Death Do Us Part:  A Study of Spouse Murder,  
10 BULL. AM. ASS’N OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 271, 279 (1982) (noting that threat of 
separation is usually a trigger for violence); Irene Hanson Frieze & Angela Browne, 
Violence in Marriage, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 207 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Torny eds., 
1989) (noting that battered wives who leave their husbands are often followed, 
harassed, and sometimes killed). 
 66. Robert F. Bornstein, The Complex Relationship Between Dependency and Domestic 
Violence:  Converging Psychological Factors and Social Forces, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 595, 
598 (2006). 
 67. Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Chattel, THE 
ADAPTED MIND:  EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 289 
(1992) [hereinafter Wilson & Daly, Man Who Mistook His Wife]. 
 68. Bornstein, supra note 66, at 598; see DONALD G. DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC 
ASSAULT OF WOMEN:  PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 143 (1995) 
(“[A] fundamental principle of attachment research is that anger follows unmet 
attachment needs.”); see also id. (citing Myriam Mongrain et al., Perceptual Biases, Affect, 
and Behavior in the Relationships of Dependents and Self-Critics, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 230, 237 (1998)) (finding an increase in hostile behavior on the part of the 
boyfriends of dependent women during conflict resolution); Hardeo Ojha & Rajiv R. 
Singh, Relationship of Marriage-Role Attitude with Dependence Proneness and Insecurity in 
University Students, 28 PSYCHOLOGIA 249, 252 (1985) (finding a strong correlation 
between dependent personality traits and traditional beliefs about marriage roles).  
But see NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN:   
NEW INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 37 (1998) (identifying a second 
type of batterer who is not emotionally dependent on his wife but is “incapable of 
forming truly intimate relationships with others”).  Doctors Jacobsen and Gottman 
nicknamed this group of batterers “cobras,” describing them as follows: 
Cobras taunt their wives by pushing them away.  Yet they want their wives to 
be there for them when they need something:  sex, companionship, money, 
or someone to get high with.  Cobras are very frightening to their wives, and 
yet at the same time captivating.  This combination makes Cobras very hard 
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of male proprietariness indicates that “men take a proprietary view of 
women’s sexuality and reproductive capacity,”69 an indication borne 
out by such phenomena as the purchasing of wives70 and the high 
value placed on female chastity.71  Wilson and Daly cite to spousal 
homicide studies finding that “the leading identified substantive 
[motive for spousal homicide] is invariably ‘jealousy.’”72 
The dependency-possessiveness model, male proprietariness, and 
the undeniable frequency of separation violence demonstrate that 
domestic violence is not random; rather, it is a pattern of systematic 
abuse by which the abuser seeks to dominate his partner through the 
use of power and control tactics including emotional, sexual, and 
physical violence.73  If the fragile sense of power and control the 
batterer derives from his abusive relationship is threatened, he will 
often increase the abuse.74  Once the violence has started, it not only 
continues, but it often escalates in frequency and in lethality.75 
D. Escaping Separation Violence 
Statistically, those women who ultimately succeed in leaving their 
partners “have had approximately five previous separations prior to 
their ultimate and final dissolution of the relationship.”76  Research 
also suggests that, while many women in abusive relationships make 
multiple attempts to leave, half of those women ultimately stay.77  The 
cycles of leaving and returning “reflect not indecision per se but a 
complex pattern of behavior that involves not only the effect of the 
                                                          
to escape from.  Their tactics of control and intimidation are remarkably 
effective in terrifying their wives into submission. 
Id. at 84. 
 69. Wilson & Daly, The Man Who Mistook His Wife, supra note 67, at 303. 
 70. WILSON & DALY, HOMICIDE, supra note 65, at 188. 
 71. Wilson & Daly, The Man Who Mistook His Wife, supra note 67, at 313. 
 72. Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Evolutionary Social Psychology and Family 
Homicide, 242 SCIENCE 519, 521 (1988). 
 73. West Virginia Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Brief Amicus Curiae, 
Thomas v. Morris, Clay County Civil Action No. 08-DV-66, at 2–3 (Sept. 18, 2009), 
available at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/briefs/oct09/35141Amicus.pdf. 
 74. See Hallie Bongar White & James G. White, Testifying About Lethality Risk 
Factors, Sw. Center for Law and Policy & U.S. Dept. of Justice Office on  
Violence Against Women, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.swclap.org/pdfs/ 
LETHALITYRISKFACTORS.pdf (stating that a batterer who believes that his partner 
is “undermining his power and control” is more likely to kill his partner). 
 75. See id. (“The most dangerous time for victims is at the time of separation.”). 
 76. LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY:  RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE 
ABUSE 60 (2003). 
 77. Id. at 60 & n.27 (citing Douglas K. Snyder & Nancy S. Scheer, Predicting 
Disposition Following Brief Residence at a Shelter for Battered Women, 9 AM. J. CMTY. 
PSYCHOL. 559, 559–65 (1981)). 
  
352 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:337 
 
violence and the partner’s influence but also other psychological and 
sociocultural factors.”78 
Women who do permanently leave have finally arrived at a point in 
their lives where they can break the Cycle of Violence for good.  
Because this irrevocable break with the abuser creates, in many cases, 
a risk of increased harm or death for the woman, she must seek 
protection from the state.  If she lives in a country that does not offer 
protection, she must seek that protection abroad, often in the form 
of political asylum.  However, as the next Part discusses, that avenue 
is often not available to her. 
II. REFUGEE LAW 
A. The Classic Refugee in International Law 
International law protecting refugees was written with a discrete 
group of people in mind:  the survivors of World War II atrocities 
who were scattered throughout Europe at the end of the war.79   
To address the post-World War II refugee situation, the United 
Nations promulgated the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.80  The 1951 Convention provided an official definition of a 
“refugee”: 
[A]ny person who . . . [a]s a result of events occurring before  
1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear,  
is unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his [or her] former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.81 
                                                          
 78. Id.; see also BROWNE, supra note 65, at 110 (listing many factors—such as 
common property, children, and mutual friends—that make it hard for women to 
leave an abusive relationship). 
 79. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 3–10 (June 1992), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6bd5a0.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR Introduction] (tracing 
the history of post-World War II refugee protection from the establishment of the 
International Refugee Organization in 1947, to the adoption of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the establishment of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees). 
 80. July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 
Convention]. 
 81. Id. at 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152.  The 1951 Convention also permitted 
signatories to restrict protection geographically, specifically, to people who were 
  
2009] REFUGEE PROTECTION FOR BATTERED WOMEN 353 
 
The 1951 Convention prohibited signatory states from returning 
persons meeting this definition to countries where they would face 
future harm.82 
In the decade following the 1951 Convention, it became evident 
that the end of World War II had not brought about an end to the 
flow of refugees.  New conflicts were producing new refugees, and 
the 1951 Convention was updated to respond to the situation.83   
The result was the adoption of the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 
Convention,84 which modified the 1951 Convention’s definition of a 
refugee by eliminating the date restrictions so that persons fleeing 
from events occurring after January 1, 1951 could be considered 
refugees.85 
The United States acceded to the 1951 Convention when it signed 
the 1967 Protocol in 1968.86  In 1980, the United States codified the 
1967 Protocol’s definition of a refugee in domestic law when it passed 
the Refugee Act of 1980.87  Under current U.S. law, individuals 
applying for refugee protection in the United States must prove four 
elements in order to establish prima facie eligibility for refugee 
protection:  (a) being outside one’s country and unable or unwilling 
to return to it; (b) fearing harm severe enough to constitute 
persecution; (c) possessing a well-founded fear of future persecution; 
and (d) being a target for persecution on account of one of  
the five protected grounds:  (1) race, (2) religion, (3) nationality,  
(4) political opinion, or (5) membership in a particular social 
group.88 
Conspicuously absent from the grounds for protection is sex or 
gender.  The possible reasons for this omission are many and varied, 
                                                          
refugees as a result of “events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951.”  Id. at 
6262, 189 U.N.T.S. at 154. 
 82. Id. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176. 
 83. UNHCR Introduction, supra note 79, at 10. 
 84. 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. 
 85. The 1967 Protocol states, 
[T]he term “refugee” shall, except as regards the application of paragraph 3 
of this article, mean any person within the definition of article I of the 
Convention as if the words “As a result of events occurring before 1 January 
1951 . . .” and the words “. . . as a result of such events,” in article 1 A (2) 
were omitted. 
Id. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.  The Protocol also eliminated the geographic 
restrictions.  Id. 
 86. See 19 U.S.T. at 6223.  The Senate ratified the Protocol on October 4, 1968, 
and the President signed it on October 15, 1968.  Id. 
 87. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). 
 88. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
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and not the focus of this Article.89  Suffice it to say that there is 
currently no official refugee protection for women on account of fear 
of harm relating to their societal status as women or to their female 
anatomy.90  That is not to suggest that women cannot or do not 
receive asylum on account of their societal status as women or on 
account of their female anatomy—they can and do91—but only that 
                                                          
 89. See generally E. Dana Neacsu, Gender-Based Persecution as a Basis for Asylum:   
An Annotated Bibliography, 1993–2002, 95 LAW LIBR. J. 191 (2003) (presenting a 
bibliography of articles that address gender-based persecution as a basis for asylum).  
For in-depth discussions regarding the addition of gender as a protected ground,  
see generally Deborah E. Anker, Women Refugees:  Forgotten No Longer?, 32 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 771 (1995) (examining the attempt to use gender to define a social group for 
protected-grounds purposes); Anjana Bahl, Home Is Where the Brute Lives:  Asylum Law 
and Gender-Based Claims of Persecution, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 33 (1997) 
(recommending that grounds for persecution need to be expanded to include 
victims of gender-based persecution); Arthur C. Helton, Shifting Grounds for Asylum:  
Female Genital Surgery and Sexual Orientation, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 467 (1998) 
(noting that there is increased debate whether refugee protections should be 
extended to include gender and sexual orientation); Emily Love, Equality in Political 
Asylum Law:  For a Legislative Recognition of Gender-Based Persecution, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S 
L.J. 133 (1994) (suggesting that Congress should amend the Refugee Act of 1980 to 
add gender-based abuse as a protected ground); Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of 
Gendered Persecution:  Fear of Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 119 (2007) [hereinafter Musalo, Floodgates] (explaining that people should not 
be concerned that allowing asylum based on gender will result in a flood of claims, 
but should focus on solving the violence that causes the claims); Maddie L. Stevens, 
Recognizing Gender-Specific Persecution:  A Proposal to Add Gender as a Sixth Refugee 
Category, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 179 (1993) (suggesting that the United States 
should add a refugee category specifically for gender); Bret Thiele, Persecution on 
Account of Gender:  A Need for Refugee Law Reform, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 221 (2000) 
(arguing that a gender category needs to be added to the definition of refugee); 
David L. Neal, Note, Women as a Social Group:  Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as 
Grounds for Asylum, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203 (1988) (arguing that women 
who are persecuted based on their sex should be granted asylum because they fulfill 
the requirements of a social group). 
 90. See Bahl, supra note 89, at 38 (“Human rights laws have traditionally provided 
inadequate protection for women.”); Helton, supra note 89, at 471 (“In terms of the 
five bases of refugee status, at least one of which would have to be established to 
warrant refugee protection, there is an absence of any terms concerning gender or 
sexual orientation.”); Neal, supra note 89, at 203 (noting that historically there has 
been no explicit recognition of sex-based persecution). 
 91. See, e.g., Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 800–03 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(permitting the reopening of reconsideration of a denial of asylum for a Somali 
woman who had been subjected to female genital mutilation (“FGM”) and holding 
that FGM is a “particularly severe form of past persecution” and a “‘permanent and 
continuing’ act of persecution”); Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 636, 643 (6th Cir. 
2004) (granting petition for review of a BIA determination of ineligibility for asylum 
to an Ethiopian woman based in part on her fear of her minor daughter being 
subjected to FGM); Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing a 
denial of asylum for an Ethiopian woman of Amharic ethnicity who was raped by her 
supervisor, a man of Tigrean ethnicity); Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 368 
(BIA 1996) (granting asylum to a Togolese woman who feared FGM); Matter of D-V-, 
21 I. & N. Dec. 77, 79–80 (BIA 1993) (granting asylum to a Haitian woman who had 
been raped by government soldiers).  But see Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 962–63  
(9th Cir. 1996) (denying petition for review of denial of asylum to an Iranian woman 
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there is no official category of “sex” or “gender” under which to apply 
for refugee protection.92  This void leaves it up to advocates and 
adjudicators to tie gender-based asylum claims to one of the five 
protected grounds. 
Arguably, however, the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
were designed to allow for the gradual broadening of protection.  
Neither document defines the term “persecution.”93  Refuge-
providing countries are thus free to interpret that term according to 
their own values, and to revise their definition over time.94   
As discussed below, however, the lack of specific protection has 
proven detrimental in cases involving battered women. 
B. Battered Women’s Asylum Claims in the United States 
1. U.S. asylum law 
In 1990, the U.S. government implemented new regulations 
governing the adjudication of asylum claims.95  Asylum claims fall 
under the jurisdiction of two federal agencies.  The Department of 
                                                          
because the oppressive gender-specific laws from which she sought asylum applied to 
all women in Iran and not solely to the applicant); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233,  
1241–42, 1244 (3d Cir. 1993) (denying petition for review of denial of asylum to an 
Iranian woman because her willingness to comply with oppressive gender-specific 
laws in order to avoid “74 lashes, a year’s imprisonment, and in many cases brutal 
rapes and death” indicated that she did not possess sufficient abhorrence of the laws 
to render their application to her persecution); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 662  
(2d Cir. 1991) (dismissing a petition for review of a denial of asylum to a Salvadoran 
woman who was raped and beaten on several occasions by  guerilla forces). 
 92. See Thiele, supra note 89, at 235 (noting that although the UNHCR has 
increasingly recognized the realities of gender-based persecution, “the Commission 
only stressed that States must exercise due diligence to prevent violence against 
refugee and internally displaced women, without addressing the issue of refugee 
status on account of gender persecution”). 
 93. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 
for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1  
(Jan. 1992), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e1364.html [hereinafter 
UNHCR Handbook] (stating that “[t]here is no universally accepted definition of 
“persecution,” and various attempts to formulate such a definition have met with 
little success”). 
 94. The UNHCR Handbook provides the following guidance for determining 
whether harm rises to the level of persecution: 
From Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, it may be inferred that a threat to 
life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or 
membership of a particular social group is always persecution.  Other serious 
violations of human rights—for the same reasons—would also constitute 
persecution. 
Id. 
 95. Aliens and Nationality, Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 
55 Fed. Reg. 30674-01 (July 27, 1990).  The current regulations governing asylum are 
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208 (2009). 
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Justice oversees the immigration courts and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals.96  The Department of Homeland Security 
adjudicates asylum cases for applicants who are not in removal 
proceedings97 and prosecutes removal cases before immigration 
courts and the Board.98 
Battered women seeking asylum bring their claims in one of three 
ways.  First, if they are present in the United States and not in 
removal proceedings, they may file an application with the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS).99  Second, battered women who are in 
removal proceedings may apply for asylum as a defense to removal by 
filing an application with the immigration court.100  If they are in 
removal proceedings as the result of a failed affirmative asylum 
application, they may renew their claim in immigration court.101  
Finally, if they are present at a port of entry and do not have the 
documents necessary to be admitted to the United States, but they 
indicate a fear of returning to their home country, the Department of 
Homeland Security Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement may refer them to USCIS for a preliminary assessment 
of their asylum claim, called a “credible fear interview.”102  Those who 
                                                          
 96. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0–.1 (2009). 
 97. Id. § 208.14.  The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 replaced the term “deportation” with the term “removal.”  Omnibus 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 308(e)(1), 
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252). 
 98. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2. 
 99. Id. §§ 208.2(a), 208.4(b).  The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service’s 
regional service center will perform initial processing and will then forward the 
application to the applicant’s local asylum office.  Id. § 208.4(b)(1).  An asylum 
officer will then interview the applicant in a non-adversarial proceeding.  Id.  
§ 208.9(b).  If the asylum officer deems the applicant eligible for asylum, the officer 
has the authority to grant asylum to the applicant.  Id. § 208.14(b).  If the asylum 
officer decides that the applicant is not eligible for asylum, and the applicant does 
not have lawful immigration status, the officer must forward the case to an 
immigration judge.  Id. § 208.14(c)(1). 
 100. Id. § 208.2(b). 
 101. Id. § 208.14(c)(1); see also id. § 208.2 (vesting in immigration judges the 
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate asylum claims for individuals in removal 
proceedings).  An older version of the regulations specified that an immigration 
judge’s review of asylum claims shall be “de novo regardless of whether or not a 
previous application was filed and adjudicated . . . prior to the initiation of exclusion 
or deportation proceedings.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (1991) (cited in Matter of  B-, 20  
I. & N. Dec. 427, 429 (BIA 1991)).  Immigration judges continue to review claims 
referred to them by the Asylum Office de novo even though this standard of review is 
no longer specified in the regulations.  See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. 
Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette:  Disparities in Asylum Adjudication,  
60 STANFORD L. REV. 295, 308, 326 (2007). 
 102. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4). 
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are found to have a credible fear of persecution are placed in 
removal proceedings, where they may file an application for asylum 
with the immigration court.103 
2. Legal bases for battered women’s asylum claims 
Battered women from countries that do not provide adequate 
protection against domestic violence generally face few hurdles in 
establishing the first three elements of a successful asylum claim:  
demonstrating unwillingness to return to their country,104 having 
experienced harm severe enough to rise to the level of persecution,105 
and possessing a well-founded fear of future persecution.106  It is the 
fourth element, the “on account of a protected ground” requirement, 
where battered women’s asylum claims tend to fail.  A discussion of 
each element of a battered woman’s asylum claim follows. 
a. Unwilling or unable to return to the home country 
In discussing a battered woman’s unwillingness or inability to 
return to her country, it is essential to understand, as a preliminary 
matter, that many abuse victims do not leave their relationships, and 
that those who do often return to their relationships.107  As discussed 
in Part I of this Article, the Cycle of Violence that entraps and then 
imprisons women in abusive relationships is difficult, and in many 
cases impossible, to break.  Those women who do leave permanently 
often do so only after making several attempts to leave over a period 
of years.108  The assertiveness inherent in the decision to leave sends a 
strong signal to the abuser that his power over his partner is waning, 
and in most cases, the decision to leave results in increased violence 
toward the victim, possibly resulting in her murder.109 
                                                          
 103. Id. § 208.30(f).  If a potential asylum applicant fails to prove to the asylum 
officer that she has a credible fear of persecution, she may have the negative credible 
fear determination reviewed by an immigration judge.  Id. § 208.30(g)(1)–(2).  If the 
applicant declines review, or the immigration judge also finds that the applicant does 
not have a credible fear, she may be removed from the United States.  Id.  
§ 208.30(g)(1)(ii). 
 104. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(C). 
 105. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). 
 106. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2). 
 107. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text (explaining and citing statistics 
that show that women do not generally leave abusive relationships). 
 108. See WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 22, at 66–67, 199 (noting that 
battered women are most likely to flee during the third phase, but many go back to 
their husbands as often as five times before they leave permanently). 
 109. See discussion supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (detailing the abuse 
suffered by women who leave their abusive relationships). 
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By the time a battered woman has fled not only her abuser, but also 
her country, and by the time she has sought asylum protection, she 
usually has arrived at a place in the Cycle of Violence, and a place in 
her own psyche, where return is no longer an option.110  She has 
made a number of decisions that were difficult and dangerous to 
implement—decisions that, in many respects, are irreversible.  Like 
Rodi Alvarado and most women fleeing abusive relationships, she has 
made and carried out an escape plan to avoid the increased violence 
that tends to accompany a decision to leave.  If she has children, she 
has taken them with her, or if unable to do so, has arranged for their 
care.  Her inability and unwillingness to return are therefore 
established, and generally are not in dispute in an asylum claim.111 
b. Whether the harm suffered or feared rises to the level of persecution 
Persecution is not defined in the 1951 Convention or the 1967 
Protocol, nor is it defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act.  
Rather, it has been left to individual countries and courts to 
determine when harm rises to the level of persecution.112  Generally, 
U.S. courts have defined persecution as severe harm, and have 
provided examples of harm that does and does not constitute 
persecution.113  Detention,114 severe beatings,115 credible threats 
                                                          
 110. See WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 22, at 198 (explaining that women 
who go to safe houses take about three to four weeks to adjust to the idea that they 
are not going back home). 
 111. It is critical that legal professionals working with domestic violence-based 
asylum cases—adjudicators, counsel for the refugee applicant, and counsel for the 
government—do not confuse multiple returns to the relationship or a lengthy 
relationship with lack of subjective fear.  As discussed in this Article, the viciousness 
of the Cycle of Violence and the reality of separation violence often prevent a woman 
from leaving an abusive relationship despite the woman’s terror. 
 112. See cases and sources cited supra notes 19, 93–94 and accompanying text.  
The Board has defined persecution as “the infliction of harm or suffering by a 
government, or persons a government is unwilling or unable to control, to overcome 
a characteristic of the victim.”  Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996) 
(citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222–23 (BIA 1985)), modified on other 
grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). 
 113. Compare Torres v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2008) (articulating 
that “detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, 
confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings or torture” may rise to the level of 
persecution), and Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that 
threats and beatings combined with deprivation of livelihood and the inability to 
escape amount to persecution), with Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 189–90 (5th Cir. 
1994) (holding that the denial of citizenship is not persecution even when it results 
in statelessness), Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
prosecution for counseling a child not to fight in Iran’s war against Iraq is not 
persecution), and De Souza v. INS, 999 F.2d 1156, 1158–59 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding 
that a denial of citizenship and education on the basis of race and nationality was not 
persecution). 
  
2009] REFUGEE PROTECTION FOR BATTERED WOMEN 359 
 
against a person’s life,116 extreme deprivation of the ability to make a 
living,117 and witnessing the death, torture, or rape of a loved one118 
are all examples of harm that courts have considered serious enough 
to rise to the level of persecution. 
Battered women experience the types of harm recognized as 
persecution by U.S. courts in asylum cases.  Therefore, this is an area 
where the case of a battered woman is similar in nature to that of the 
classic refugee—both are subjected to severe physical and 
psychological harm by an entity seeking to control the behavior of 
the individual.  Because of this similarity, the issue of persecution was 
not in dispute in Rodi Alvarado’s case,119 and would not likely be in 
dispute in cases of other battered women.  Alvarado established 
through testimony and corroborating evidence that the frequency 
and severity of the abuse she had endured over the years at the hands 
of her husband,120 as well as the harm she would likely suffer upon 
her return to Guatemala,121 was severe enough to rise to the level of 
persecution.  If other battered woman can establish through their 
own testimony and corroborating evidence that they have endured 
multiple severe beatings at the hands of their abusive partners, they 
too are not likely to encounter difficulty in establishing that they have 
suffered harm rising to the level of persecution.122 
                                                          
 114. See, e.g., Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
detention for ten days accompanied by daily beatings and hard labor constitutes 
persecution, even in the absence of serious physical injury). 
 115. See, e.g., Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that the cumulative effects of “specific instances of violence and harassment” 
constitute persecution). 
 116. See, e.g., Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
persistent death threats and assaults against one’s family constitute persecution). 
 117. See, e.g., Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that 
“deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage . . . for reasons of race, 
religion, or political opinion” may rise to the level of persecution). 
 118. See, e.g., Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2004) (approving a 
principle that being forced to witness the torture of a child constitutes persecution). 
 119. See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 914 (BIA 1999), vacated and remanded 
to stay reconsideration (A.G. 2001), remanded for reconsideration, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 
2005), lifted stay and remanded for reconsideration, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008) 
(stating that “we agree with the Immigration Judge that the severe injuries sustained 
by the respondent rise to the level of harm sufficient (and more than sufficient) to 
constitute ‘persecution’”). 
 120. See id. at 908–10 (detailing the severe abuse that Alvarado’s husband inflicted 
on her). 
 121. See id. at 910 (noting that a witness had heard from Alvarado’s sister that 
Alvarado’s husband was “going to hunt her down and kill her if she comes back to 
Guatemala”). 
 122. Alvarado’s case, for example, included her own testimony, witness testimony, 
expert testimony, and numerous reports and articles on violence against women in 
Guatemala.  See id. at 908–11. 
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c. Well-founded fear of future persecution 
Proving past persecution, however, is only part of the refugee 
protection equation.  Courts also evaluate whether an applicant has a 
well-founded fear of continued persecution if she were to return to 
her country.123  Courts evaluate several factors, discussed below, to 
determine whether an applicant’s fear is well-founded. 
The inquiry into whether an asylum applicant possesses a well-
founded fear of future persecution contains a two-part analysis:   
(1) whether the applicant has a subjective fear of persecution, and 
(2) whether the applicant’s fear is objectively reasonable.124  The first 
part of the inquiry is usually established fairly simply with the 
applicant’s own testimony that she is fearful of returning to her 
country.125  In establishing the second part of the inquiry, however, 
the applicant must prove that:  (1) she possesses a characteristic or 
belief that her “persecutor seeks to overcome” through the infliction 
of harm; (2) that the persecutor is “aware or could [easily] become 
aware” of the belief or characteristic; (3) that the persecutor is 
capable of inflicting harm on the applicant; and (4) that the 
persecutor is inclined to inflict harm on the applicant.126 
Under this formulation, a battered woman who can prove past 
persecution and government inability or unwillingness to protect her 
from future abuse would have little difficulty establishing that her 
                                                          
 123. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2009) (establishing that past persecution creates 
a presumption that the applicant will suffer future persecution if returned to her 
country); see also Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (BIA 1989) (holding that an 
applicant who has suffered “atrocious forms of persecution” may be entitled to 
asylum as a humanitarian matter even if there is no fear of future persecution 
(quoting UNCHR Handbook, supra note 93, at ¶ 136)).  The U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security may rebut the presumption of future persecution if they show by 
a preponderance of the evidence that “[t]here has been a fundamental change in 
circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of 
persecution” or that the applicant could reasonably relocate to another part of the 
country in order to avoid future persecution.  8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(i), (1)(ii).  
Even in the absence of a well-founded fear of persecution, an applicant may still 
qualify for asylum if she “has demonstrated compelling reasons for being unwilling 
or unable to return to the country arising out of the severity of the past persecution,” 
or “has established that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she may suffer 
other serious harm upon removal to that country.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii). 
 124. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 213 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by 
Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). 
 125. But see Bridgette A. Carr, We Don’t Need to See Them Cry:  Eliminating the 
Subjective Apprehension Element of the Well-Founded Fear Analysis for Child Refugee 
Applicants, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 535, 544–45 (2006) (pointing out that children may lack 
the capacity to understand their situations sufficiently to feel fearful, or may lack the 
capacity to articulate their objective fear). 
 126. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. at 446 (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. at 226), abrogated by Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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fear is objectively reasonable.  With respect to the first element, the 
characteristic she possesses is fairly obvious:  she is a woman and she 
is the persecutor’s spouse or partner.127  With respect to the 
remaining three elements, it is self-evident that the persecutor is 
aware that his victim is a woman and that she is his spouse; if he has 
subjected her to abuse previously, then it is also clear that he is 
capable of inflicting and inclined to inflict harm on her. 
d. On account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group 
In the case of a battered woman, the determination of whether a 
fear is well-founded is closely tied to whether the persecution will 
occur on account of one of the five protected grounds:  (1) race,  
(2) religion, (3) nationality, (4) political opinion, or (5) membership 
in a particular social group.128  It is this final element of the refugee 
definition, the nexus to a protected ground, upon which so many 
domestic violence-based claims fail. 
In domestic violence-based asylum cases, race and nationality are 
typically irrelevant.  In a few cases, applicants successfully claim 
religion or political opinion as the nexus.  For example, in Matter of  
S-A-,129 the applicant applied for asylum on the basis that her religious 
beliefs, specifically her liberal interpretation of Islam, conflicted with 
her father’s orthodox interpretation of Islam.130  The Board found 
that the applicant’s father persecuted her by beating her in an 
attempt to overcome her different religious beliefs.131  However, 
applications for asylum based on domestic violence persecution on 
account of religious beliefs are rare.  Instead, most survivors of 
domestic violence apply for asylum based on their membership in a 
particular social group. 
                                                          
 127. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Request for Certification and Reversal 
of the Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, In re R-A- (Interim Decision 
No. 3403) at 10, Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999) (No. A 73-753-922) 
(arguing that “gender is an appropriate characteristic defining ‘particular social 
group’ for asylum purposes”); id. at 20–22 (asserting that “the status of being a wife 
or female intimate partner is fundamental to the identity of the individual, and often 
immutable”); cf. id. at 9 n.10 (listing a number of cases from foreign courts in which 
gender and status as a battered woman were found to be legitimate social groups for 
purposes of refugee protection). 
 128. See, e.g., Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 914 (agreeing with the immigration 
judge that the determinative issue for persecution “is whether the harm experienced 
by the respondent was, or in the future may be, inflicted ‘on account of’ a statutorily 
protected ground”). 
 129. 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000). 
 130. Id. at 1329. 
 131. Id. at 1336. 
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Like “persecution,” the term “particular social group” is not 
defined in the Refugee Convention or in the U.S. Refugee Act.  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals provided guidance as to what 
constitutes a particular social group in 1985 in the precedential 
Matter of Acosta case: 
[W]e interpret the phrase “persecution on account of membership 
in a particular social group” to mean persecution that is directed 
toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of 
whom share a common, immutable characteristic.  The shared 
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship 
ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience 
such as former military leadership or land ownership.  The 
particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this 
construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis.  
However, whatever the common characteristic that defines the 
group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot 
change, or should not be required to change because it is 
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.132 
Examples of social groups considered valid include sexual 
orientation,133 kinship and family,134 and former military leadership.135  
Gender, too, has qualified as a particular social group.136  However, 
even if gender were universally accepted as a viable particular social 
group, battered women would still not find universal acceptance as 
refugees. 
It is indisputable that women suffer various levels of harm on 
account of their sex.  Gender-based harm includes employment 
discrimination, domestic violence, and rape, as well as forced 
                                                          
 132. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by 
Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). 
 133. See, e.g., Kadri v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2008) (allowing sexual 
orientation to be the basis for a persecution claim); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 
1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that alien homosexuals are members of a 
particular social group for purpose of the asylum statute); Amanfi v. Ashcroft,  
328 F.3d 719, 724 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that alien homosexuals are members of a 
particular social group for purpose of the asylum statute). 
 134. See, e.g., Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (accepting 
nuclear family membership as a particular social group); Matter of H-, 21 I. & N. 
Dec. 337, 343 (BIA 1996) (accepting clan membership as a particular social group). 
 135. See, e.g., Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985) (describing 
former military leadership as an innate characteristic), overruled in part by Matter of 
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). 
 136. See id. (noting that the determination of whether sex should be considered a 
particular social group should be made on a case-by-case basis); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 
1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (considering sex as an innate characteristic that may allow 
for membership in a particular social group). 
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marriage, female genital mutilation, and “honor crimes.”137  Gender 
as a social group, when combined with the other criteria for refugee 
protection—unwillingness to return due to a well-founded fear of 
persecution, and the inability or unwillingness of the applicant’s 
country to protect her from persecution—is a viable social group.138  
Nevertheless, refugee protection is often elusive for women who do 
not combine their claims with some other ground for refugee 
protection or with a narrower social group claim.139  Despite the 
proposal of several potentially viable social groups, a particular social 
group that is viable for all battered women seeking asylum has not 
emerged. 
III. ATTEMPTED AND PROPOSED SOCIAL GROUPS FOR  
BATTERED WOMEN 
The challenge faced by adjudicators, advocates, and the 
government has been to articulate a social group that not only 
recognizes the realities of domestic violence but also fits within the 
confines of a refugee definition that makes no mention of gender-
based persecution.140  Each approach discussed below attempts to 
attain this delicate balance, but each ultimately falls short. 
                                                          
 137. See Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective:  Violence 
Against Women and “Honor” Crimes, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Apr. 5, 2001, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2001/04/05/item-12-integration-human-rights-
women-and-gender-perspective-violence-against-women (defining honor crimes as 
“acts of violence, usually murder, committed by male family members against female 
family members who are perceived to have brought dishonor upon the family”). 
 138. See Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas:  A Critical Review of United 
States, Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims,  
13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 25, 63 (1998) (“The anti-discrimination orientation of the 
refugee definition implies that like other grounds of persecution, a particular social 
group is also characterized by a marginalized or disadvantaged status in society which 
makes members vulnerable to oppression, including (but not limited to) the actual 
persecution feared by the claimant.”). 
 139. See Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards’ Fathers and Good Victims:  
Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 HASTINGS 
L.J. 557, 590–91 (2000) (asserting that “sex could be sufficient to define a social 
group” but women have needed additional characteristics due to the difficulty in 
arguing that violence against women is based on gender); Lori Nessel,  
“Willful Blindness” to Gender-Based Violence Abroad:  United States’ Implementation of Article 
Three of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71, 76 (2004) 
(noting that “the United States excludes social groups based solely on sex and 
requires strong evidence that the claimant’s membership in a ‘gender-plus’ 
protected group served as the primary motivation for the persecutor’s conduct”);  
see also Deborah Anker et al., Women Whose Governments Are Unable or Unwilling to 
Provide Reasonable Protection from Violence May Qualify as Refugees Under United States 
Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 709, 745 (1997) (noting that the gender-plus 
requirement “violates the United States’ international and domestic legal duties to 
apply all its laws without discrimination”). 
 140. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
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A. Matter of R-A-:  “Women Who Have Been Involved Intimately with 
Male Companions Who Believe that Women Are to Live Under  
Male Domination” 
The immigration judge who heard Rodi Alvarado’s case granted 
her application for asylum on the basis of political opinion and 
membership in a particular social group:  “Guatemalan women who 
have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, 
who believe that women are to live under male domination.”141  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals paraphrased the immigration judge’s 
holding as follows: 
[S]uch a group was cognizable and cohesive, as members shared 
the common and immutable characteristics of gender and the 
experience of having been intimately involved with a male 
companion who practices male domination through violence.  The 
Immigration Judge then held that members of such a group are 
targeted for persecution by the men who seek to dominate and 
control them.142 
The Board then proceeded to reject that social group for reasons 
discussed below and reversed the grant of asylum.143  On the one 
hand, the Board’s reversal of the grant represents a colossal failure to 
understand the dynamics of domestic violence.  Its decision is rife 
with domestic violence myths and is pervaded by an overall 
misperception of domestic violence as solely a “private” matter not 
influenced by the state, and thus not worthy of the protection 
afforded to bona fide refugees.  On the other hand, the Board’s 
reasoning is sound in some respects given the narrow confines of 
asylum law, particularly with regard to social group formulation. 
1. Rejection of the social group due to the Board’s failure to understand the 
dynamics of domestic violence 
The Board’s majority opinion demonstrates a profound ignorance 
of the dynamics of domestic violence relationships, the motivations of 
an abuser, and the role of the state in perpetuating domestic 
violence.  The Board laments domestic violence but pointedly refuses 
to acknowledge that it is anything more than an unfortunate private 
occurrence, random in nature, and completely separate from the 
                                                          
 141. See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 911 (BIA 1999), vacated and remanded 
to stay reconsideration (A.G. 2001), remanded for reconsideration, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694  
(A.G. 2005), lifted stay and remanded for reconsideration, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 927–28. 
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types of state-sponsored forms of persecution for which refugee 
protection was designed.144  The Board also mischaracterizes the role 
that society plays in perpetuating domestic violence by failing to 
recognize spousal abuse as an important societal attribute.145 
a. Mischaracterization of domestic violence as random 
The Board, intent on reinforcing the randomness and private 
nature of domestic violence, peppers its decision with frequent 
references to the lack of coherent motivation on the part of the 
persecutor.  For example, the Board notes the “seeming senselessness 
and irrationality of his motives.”146  The Board also states that “the 
respondent’s husband harmed the respondent regardless of what she 
actually believed or what he thought she believed.”147 
The Board’s perception of domestic violence as an unfortunate but 
random occurrence is obvious in its interpretation of Ms. Alvarado’s 
testimony: 
The respondent testified that the abuse began “from the moment 
[they] were married.”  Even after the respondent “learned through 
experience” to acquiesce to his demands, he still abused her.  The 
abuse took place before she left him initially, and it continued after 
she returned to him.  In fact, he said he “didn’t care” what she did 
to escape because he would find her.  He also hurt her before her 
first call to the police and after her last plea for help. 148 
. . . . 
The respondent stated that “[a]s time went on, he hit me for no 
reason at all.”149 
. . . . 
When she asked for his motivation, he broke into a familiar refrain, 
“I can do it if I want to.”150 
. . . . 
[T]he arbitrary nature of the attacks further suggests it was not the 
respondent’s claimed social group characteristics that he sought to 
overcome.  The record indicates that there is nothing the 
                                                          
 144. See id. at 914 (acknowledging the respondent’s situation with “great 
sympathy” and holding “extreme contempt” for the actions of her husband, but 
questioning if refugee law should supply the remedy). 
 145. Id. at 918. 
 146. Id. at 908. 
 147. Id. at 914. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 908. 
 150. Id. at 909. 
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respondent could have done to have satisfied her husband and 
prevented further abuse.151 
. . . . 
When asked on cross-examination, the respondent at first indicated 
that she had no opinion of why her husband acted the way he did.  
She supposed, however, that it was because he had been mistreated 
when he was in the army . . . .  The respondent believed he would abuse 
any woman who was his wife.152 
The misdirected emphasis on the seeming randomness of the 
abuse ignores one of the most fundamental realities of domestic 
violence discussed in Part I of this Article:  abusers never abuse 
randomly.  Each incident of abuse—whether physical, emotional, or 
directed at a loved one of the actual target—is designed to forge and 
maintain a wheel of control from which the Cycle of Violence gains 
its momentum.  Rodi Alvarado’s husband’s abuse was not random, 
though it may have occurred at random intervals.  On the contrary, 
Alvarado’s husband abused her for two clearly identifiable reasons:  
(1) to remind her of his control over her, and (2) to punish her when 
she challenged that control. 
b. Failure to recognize the state’s complicity in the proliferation of 
domestic violence 
The Board also dismissed Rodi Alvarado’s claim for failure to state 
a particular social group that represents an “important societal 
attribute.”153  Specifically, the Board stated: 
[Alvarado] has not shown that spouse abuse is itself an important 
societal attribute, or, in other words, that the characteristic of 
being abused is one that is important within Guatemalan 
society . . . .  [S]he has not shown that women are expected by 
society to be abused, or that there are any adverse societal 
consequences to women or their husbands if the women are not 
abused.154 
This assertion is disingenuous at best.  Clearly, Alvarado was not 
arguing that Guatemalan society expects women to be abused by 
their husbands.  Rather, the social group she proposed suggests that 
if women are abused, the Guatemalan government will fail to protect 
them.  The basis of this failure to protect is not a per se expectation 
that women should and will be abused, but may reflect, perhaps, a 
                                                          
 151. Id. at 921. 
 152. Id. at 909 (emphasis added). 
 153. Id. at 919. 
 154. Id. 
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societal belief that a male’s treatment of his spouse is his prerogative.  
That is, a man can decide to beat or not beat his wife; the state will 
not interfere with that decision just as it will not interfere with the 
man’s decision to buy or not buy property, to relocate or remain in 
the same domicile, or to seek new employment.155 
The state’s refusal to protect abused women is consistent with the 
state’s perception of women as a particular social group of beings 
subordinate to men.  The important societal attribute is women’s 
subordination and subjugation to men’s will.  As the dissent in Matter 
of R-A- noted: 
The record confirms the Immigration Judge’s finding that in 
Guatemala there are “institutional biases against women that 
prevent female victims of domestic violence from receiving 
protection from their male companions or spouses.”  The 
Immigration Judge found that these institutional biases “appear to 
stem from a pervasive belief, common in patriarchal societies, that 
a man should be able to control a wife or female companion by any 
means he sees fit:  including rape, torture, and beatings.”156 
c. Blaming the victim 
Another example of the Board’s failure to understand the 
dynamics of domestic violence is its characterization of Rodi 
Alvarado’s situation as one that she could have avoided by exercising 
better judgment.  In referencing the testimony of Dr. Doris Bersing, 
an expert witness who testified regarding the prevalence of domestic 
violence in Latin America, the Board stated that “if a woman chooses 
the wrong husband [i.e., one who does not ‘honor, respect and take 
                                                          
 155. See id. at 909.  The Board described Alvarado’s interaction with the police in 
Guatemala as follows: 
The respondent’s pleas to Guatemalan police did not gain her protection.  
On three occasions, the police issued summons [sic] for her husband to 
appear, but he ignored them, and the police did not take further action.  
Twice, the respondent called the police, but they never responded.  When 
the respondent appeared before a judge, he told her that he would not 
interfere in domestic disputes. 
Id. 
 156. Id. at 930 (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting); USAID, The Women’s 
Legal Rights Initiative Final Report 71 (2007) (asserting that not all Guatemalan women 
know their rights because of certain Guatemalan social norms); see also AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, Guatemala:  No Protection, No Justice:  Killings of Women (2006), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGAMR340192006&lang=e 
(“[T]he persistence of discriminatory legislation continues to mean that many forms 
of gender-based violence against women—in particular violence against women in 
the family and sexual harassment—go undetected.  It also perpetuates violence 
against women and fosters a climate of impunity for crimes committed against 
women and girls.”). 
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care of’ her but rather abuses her], her options are few in a country 
like Guatemala . . . .”157  The Board’s blithe reference to domestic 
violence as a result of a poor choice of a spouse fails to recognize the 
insidious nature of abusive relationships and inappropriately 
minimizes the realities of domestic violence. 
Using its flawed perception of abusive relationships, the Board 
articulated two characteristics of Alvarado’s claim that doom it to 
failure under the Board’s erroneous “classic refugee” analysis.  First, 
the Board noted that neither the members of the proposed particular 
social group, nor the persecutors, view themselves as part of that 
group.158  Second, the Board held that even if Alvarado’s persecutor 
had viewed her as part of that group, it was not clear that he would 
harm her because she was a member of that group.159 
2. Rejection of the social group due to flawed legal theories 
As discussed above in Part II of this Article, a particular social 
group must meet strict requirements in order to qualify for refugee 
protection.  The social group proposed by Alvarado—”women who 
have been involved intimately with male companions who believe that 
women are to live under male domination”—would be a viable social 
group if gender were more readily accepted as a particular social 
group in general.  However, the Board rejected the asylum claim on 
grounds that are likely to continue to plague domestic violence-based 
asylum claims until there is a significant change in how gender-based 
claims are viewed overall.  First, the Board found that the lack of 
recognition of the social group by its alleged members, by their 
persecutors, and by their society in general defeated the possibility 
that the group exists.160  Second, the Board found no nexus between 
the proposed social group and the abuse.161  As discussed below, both 
of these findings, to some degree, are correct. 
a. Lack of recognition of social group 
The Board found that Alvarado’s claimed social group failed 
because Alvarado did not show that “victims of spouse abuse view 
themselves as members of this group, [or], most importantly, that 
their male oppressors see their victimized companions as part of this 
                                                          
 157. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 910. 
 158. Id. at 918. 
 159. Id. at 920. 
 160. Id. at 918–19. 
 161. Id. at 923. 
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group.”162  In other words, unlike the ethnic tribe referenced in the 
Introduction of this Article, women in abusive relationships do not 
necessarily identify with a group of other women who share that 
characteristic.  According to the Board, there is no cohesive sense of 
common identity, shared kinship, or shared history to bind the 
women together, other than the fact that they are battered spouses.163 
To support its assertion, the Board noted that the persecutor 
targeted only his wife, and did not target other members of the 
proposed social group: 
The record indicates that [the respondent’s husband] has targeted 
only the respondent.  The respondent’s husband has not shown an 
interest in any member of this group other than the respondent 
herself.  The respondent fails to show how other members of the 
group may be at risk of harm from him.  If group membership 
were the motivation behind his abuse, one would expect to see 
some evidence of it manifested in actions toward other members of 
the same group.164 
However, the Board failed to articulate why this is relevant or 
consistent with the Refugee Convention.  Neither the Convention 
nor U.S. asylum law requires that an asylum applicant prove that her 
particular persecutor is targeting other members of her social group.  
Such a showing may support the applicant’s claim, but is not 
determinative in and of itself.165 
Moreover, the Board’s insistence that a valid social group is 
necessarily comprised of members fully cognizant of their 
membership in the group further highlights the Board’s lack of 
understanding of domestic violence as a societal problem.  Domestic 
violence, particularly in countries that are unable or unwilling to 
                                                          
 162. Id. at 918. 
 163. See id. at 912 (requiring a “voluntary associational relationship among the 
purported members” of a particular social group (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 
801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986))). 
 164. Id. at 920. 
 165. In Matter of R-A-, the Board based this portion of its social group analysis in 
part on Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574 (9th Cir. 1986), which involved a 
particular social group consisting of “young, urban, working class males of military 
age who have never served in the military or otherwise expressed support for the 
government [of El Salvador].”  See 22 I. & N. Dec. at 920.  However, as the dissent 
points out, the facts of Sanchez-Trujillo differ significantly from those of Matter of R-A-: 
[Alvarado’s] case does not involve the type of all-encompassing grouping 
posited in Sanchez-Trujillo, which arose in the context of countrywide civil 
strife and anarchy.  Here, the circumstances of group members who share 
the immutable traits of gender and a relationship to an abusive partner are 
distinct from those of other members of society who may fear general civil 
strife, criminal assault or other social disorder. 
Id. at 933 (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting). 
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protect victims, is the manifestation of a state belief in male 
dominance.166  As part of the effort to control, marginalize and 
subjugate women, domestic violence is relegated to the private 
sphere and is not openly discussed and attacked as a societal issue.167  
Resources for its victims are scarce, state protection from it is virtually 
nonexistent, and blame for it falls on its victims rather than on its 
perpetrators.168  In this environment, the fact that the members of the 
particular social group are not identifying each other and rallying 
together under a visible banner is hardly surprising. 
The Board also took an overly narrow approach toward social 
group formulation by holding that, in order to be valid, a particular 
social group must be “recognized and understood to be a societal 
faction, or . . . otherwise [be] a recognized segment of the 
population, within [the applicant’s home country].”169  Given that 
one tactic of persecution is to force a subjugated group to remain 
invisible,170 this requirement is unrealistic and inconsistent with the 
principles of refugee protection. 
                                                          
 166. See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 939 (Guendelsberg, Board Member, 
dissenting).  The dissent stated, 
[D]omestic violence exist[s] as a means by which men may systematically 
destroy the power of women, a form of violence rooted in the economic, 
social, and cultural subordination of women.  The fundamental purpose of 
domestic violence is to punish, humiliate, and exercise power over the victim 
on account of her gender . . . . 
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also id. (defining domestic violence as a “powerful 
tool of oppression” against women that is “used to control women in . . . the home” 
(quoting U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Report 
of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 47th Sess., Supp.  
No. 38, ¶ 26, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992))). 
 167. See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday:  Domestic Violence 
as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 296 (1994) (arguing that the 
consequences of private gender-based violence need to be viewed legally on the same 
level as “other forms of inhumane subordinating official violence”). 
 168. See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 942 (suggesting that the Department of 
Justice Guidelines should not distinguish between private forms of persecution, such 
as the “heinous abuse” suffered by the respondent, and “public forms of persecution, 
typically suffered by men”) (citing Kristin E. Kandt, United States Asylum Law:  
Recognizing Persecution Based on Gender Using Canada as a Comparison, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 137, 144–45 (1995)); see also Pamela Goldberg, Anyplace But Home:  Asylum in the 
United States for Women Fleeing Intimate Violence, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 565, 591–92 
(1993) (expressing concern about the lack of clarity of the definition of a “particular 
social group” in the United States); Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution:  Assessing 
the Asylum Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 625 (1993) (presenting an 
improved system for considering asylum for women through a multifaceted test). 
 169. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918. 
 170. See generally Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in 
Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to 
Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 51 (2008) (explaining that 
“[t]he new ‘social visibility’ requirement raises the specter of the private/public 
distinction by requiring members of a particular social group to have a public face,” 
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In countries where protection from the batterer is not available, 
battered women may feel compelled to remain invisible.  The 
psychology of abusive relationships is again illustrative.  Battered 
women usually blame themselves for the abuse, and they are ashamed 
of the pity that their situation tends to evoke.171  In a society that 
implicitly condones domestic violence by failing to provide adequate 
protection to the victim, the victim’s shame combines with a fear of 
retribution, thereby intensifying the compulsion to remain silent and 
invisible.172 
Even if one were to accept the assertion that a particular social 
group must be a “recognized segment of the population,” the Board’s 
approach toward the inquiry was still too narrow.  In essence, the 
Board failed to clarify who exactly must recognize the segment of the 
population.  The persecutors and the victims may not articulate the 
social group; however, the existence of agencies and other resources 
for domestic violence victims demonstrates that people within a 
particular society do indeed consider battered women as a 
recognized segment of the population. 
b. The lack of a nexus between the persecution and the proposed  
social group 
The Board pointed out that, even if there were a social group of 
“women who have been involved intimately with male companions 
who believe that women are to live under male domination,” 
membership in such a social group, in and of itself, would not 
motivate the persecutor to abuse his intimate partner.173  The Board’s 
assertion is correct.  The persecutor acts because he believes in male 
domination and he seeks to achieve it through abuse.  He does not 
act because his intimate partner is in a relationship with him or 
because he seeks to punish her for being in a relationship with him. 
                                                          
and that the requirement “may well result in the denial of asylum claims brought by 
some of the most vulnerable individuals, notwithstanding the existence of a 
‘protected characteristic’”). 
 171. WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 22, at 63. 
 172. See Marouf, supra note 170, at 94–95 (explaining that a woman’s inclination 
to maintain the secrecy of her domestic victimization may stem from both individual 
level factors, including “fear that their children may also become victims, financial or 
psychological dependence on the abuser, lack of social support, fear of being blamed 
by society, or general feelings of helplessness,” as well as societal level factors, 
including the “widespread social tolerance and the social prominence of an idealized 
view of the home and family life,” “social stigma,” “social norms that legitimate or 
even glorify domestic violence against women,” “social isolation,” and “[d]eep-rooted 
ideas about the privacy of the family”). 
 173. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918–19. 
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Alvarado’s claimed social group does not fully capture the reason 
for the persecution.  A batterer does not abuse a woman who has 
been involved intimately with him merely because she has been 
involved intimately with him or because the abuser believes in male 
domination.  Rather, the batterer abuses the woman because she has 
challenged the batterer’s closely held belief in male domination by 
leaving the relationship.  This challenge fuels the batterer’s 
motivation to persecute the woman. 
B. The Department of Justice’s Proposed Regulations 
On December 7, 2000, the Department of Justice issued proposed 
regulations intended to provide “generally applicable principles that 
will allow for case-by-case adjudication of claims based on domestic 
violence or other serious harm inflicted by individual non-state 
actors.”174  One of the Department’s stated reasons for issuing the 
proposed regulations was to “address analytical issues that have arisen 
in the context of some claims based on domestic violence, and in 
particular in the Board’s decision in In re R-A- . . . .”175  The 
Department also sought to clarify and homogenize some of the 
various approaches to social group formulation.  Although it is useful 
that the Department rejected the Board’s strict approach, the 
proposed regulations fall short of guaranteeing refugee protection 
for battered women. 
1. Rejection of the Board’s restrictions on establishing a valid particular 
social group 
The preamble to the proposed regulations confirms that two 
particular factors upon which the Board relied to deny asylum in 
Matter of R-A-—whether the social group is “a recognized segment of 
the population”176 and whether the applicant’s society draws 
distinctions “between those who share and those who do not share 
the characteristic”177—are factors which the Board may consider but 
“are not determinative of the question of whether a valid social group 
exists.”178  The proposed regulations state that the following factors 
must be considered:  (1) sharing a “common, immutable 
characteristic . . . that a member either cannot change or that is so 
                                                          
 174. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,589 (proposed 
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
 175. Id. at 76,592. 
 176. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918. 
 177. Id. at 919. 
 178. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,594. 
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fundamental to the identity or conscience of the member that he or 
she should not be required to change it,”179 and (2) having a past 
experience—if it defines the group—that, when it occurred, “the 
member either could not have changed or was so fundamental to his 
or her identity or conscience that he or she should not have been 
required to change it.”180 
If an adjudicator understands the dynamics and psychology of 
abusive relationships, the proposed regulatory language may be 
sufficient to ensure a grant of asylum based on several social group 
formulations, including that of “women who have fled severely 
abusive relationships.”  The past experience of having left the 
relationship defines the social group and represents an immutable 
characteristic.  Even if a woman is forced to return to her abuser, the 
fact that she left is immutable, or at least is fundamental to her 
identity or conscience once she leaves the relationship.181  An 
adjudicator who understands the danger of separation violence 
would likely have little difficulty finding that the applicant fits within 
the definition of a refugee. 
The problem demonstrated so clearly by the majority opinion in 
Matter of R-A-, however, is that too many adjudicators do not 
understand the complex dynamics of abusive relationships.  If this 
continues to be true, the proposed regulatory language would 
therefore fail to achieve its stated goal of “aid[ing] in the assessment 
of claims made by applicants who have suffered or fear domestic 
violence.”182 
2. Failure to articulate a specific basis for asylum claims based on  
domestic violence 
Although the proposed regulations attempt to create a viable 
framework for adjudicating domestic violence-based asylum claims, 
they do not specifically refer to domestic violence claims except in 
the preamble.183  In fact, the Department of Justice specifically 
declined to articulate a rule for deciding domestic violence-based 
asylum claims in favor of “broadly applicable principles to guide 
adjudicators in applying the refugee definition and other statutory 
and regulatory provisions generally”184: 
                                                          
 179. Id. at 76,598. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 182. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,588. 
 183. Id. at 76,595. 
 184. Id. 
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The Department [of Justice] has tentatively concluded that this 
approach would be more useful than simply announcing a 
categorical rule that a victim of domestic violence is or can be a 
refugee on account of that experience or fear . . . .  The current 
proposal of the Department would encourage development of the 
law in the area of domestic violence as well as in other new claims 
that may arise.185 
The Department of Justice’s failure to articulate a specific basis 
upon which battered women can qualify for asylum, however, leaves 
such applicants vulnerable to erroneous adjudication by fact-finders 
who are not familiar with the psychology of domestic violence.  
Moreover, the Department’s “broadly applicable principles” are 
nothing more than a codification of case law existing long before the 
Board denied Alvarado asylum.  For example, the regulations state 
that an asylum applicant must establish: 
that the persecutor acted, or that there is a reasonable possibility 
that the persecutor would act, against the applicant on account of 
the applicant’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion, or on account of what 
the persecutor perceives to be the applicant’s race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.186 
This rule merely restates U.S. asylum law as it has existed for 
decades.  It does not provide any clarification, beyond what is stated 
in the preamble, as to how an adjudicator should apply this rule to 
battered women. 
The same problem arises with respect to the section of the 
proposed rule dealing with membership in a particular social group.  
That section states: 
A particular social group is composed of members who share a 
common, immutable characteristic, such as sex, color, kinship ties, 
or past experience, that a member either cannot change or that is 
so fundamental to the identity or conscience of the member that 
he or she should not be required to change it.187 
This is a mere restatement of Matter of Acosta,188 a precedential 
decision of the Board issued in 1985.189  The preamble emphasizes 
                                                          
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 76,597–98. 
 187. Id. at 76,598. 
 188. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985). 
 189. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,593 (declaring 
that the proposed regulation codifies the reasoning of Matter of Acosta, “[t]he key 
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that gender is an immutable trait and that marriage and other 
intimate relationships may be considered immutable traits.190  
However, without a clear directive, an adjudicator might still fail to 
recognize that a battered woman is being persecuted on account of 
her membership in a particular social group. 
The preamble to the proposed regulations attempts to provide a 
reasonable framework for granting asylum to battered women.  The 
preamble also corrects and clarifies several errors that the Board 
made in Matter of R-A-.  However, by failing to articulate a clear basis 
for granting refugee protection, and by failing to address domestic 
violence specifically in the regulations themselves, the proposed 
regulations fail to ensure that women who have fled from severely 
abusive relationships will receive refugee protection. 
C. The Department of Homeland Security’s 2004 Proposed Social Group:  
“Married Women in Guatemala Who are Unable to Leave the Relationship” 
As a result of the Board’s rejection of Alvarado’s claimed social 
group, the Board sustained the appeal of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) and reversed the grant of asylum.191   
As discussed above, this appeal was not the end of the Alvarado case.  
Three different U.S. Attorneys General have certified the case for 
review, and each side has had the opportunity to re-litigate its 
position.192 
In a somewhat surprising turn of events (given that it originated 
from the party that initially opposed a grant of asylum for Rodi 
Alvarado), the Department of Homeland Security stated, in a brief 
submitted to Attorney General John Ashcroft in 2004, that it believed 
that Rodi Alvarado was eligible for asylum.193  However, the definition 
of the social group upon which the Department of Homeland 
Security based this eligibility was critically flawed. 
The Department asserted that Alvarado was eligible for asylum as a 
member of the particular social group, “married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship.”194  This social 
                                                          
Board decision on the meaning of a ‘particular social group’ [which] requires that 
members of the group share a ‘common, immutable’ trait”). 
 190. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,593. 
 191. Id. at 928.  The INS prosecuted immigration cases before the Department of 
Homeland Security was created. 
 192. Recently, the case was remanded to a local immigration judge in San 
Francisco.  See E-mail from Karen Musalo to Author (Apr. 16, 2009) (on file with 
Author). 
 193. DHS Brief 2004, supra note 9, at 43. 
 194. Id. at 36. 
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group must fail because it does not accurately describe the 
individuals it seeks to encompass and too narrowly characterizes the 
social group of battered women. 
The proposed social group mischaracterizes its members as 
individuals who are unable to leave their relationships.  To state the 
obvious, however, it is clear that if they were unable to leave their 
relationships, they would not be in the United States applying for 
asylum.  The assumption implicit in this proposed social group is 
that, if the applicants were to return to their countries, they would be 
unable to escape their abusers.  But the proposed social group fails to 
encapsulate one of the most important aspects of an abusive 
relationship:  the abuser is not motivated to persecute because the 
woman cannot leave the relationship; rather, the abuser is motivated 
to persecute because the woman can and did leave the relationship. 
Moreover, the phrase “unable to leave the relationship” is vague 
and vulnerable to misconstruction.  A battered spouse, for example, 
may be able to leave the relationship by obtaining a civil divorce, but 
she may decline to do so because the state lacks the capacity and 
willingness to protect her once she does.  The fact that she has a 
means of officially leaving the relationship by securing a divorce 
should not prevent her from obtaining asylum in the United States. 
Furthermore, the Department of Homeland Security improperly 
narrowed the social group by including the applicant’s marital status 
in its social group formulation.  Alvarado’s status as a married woman 
certainly may have contributed to both the state’s unwillingness to 
protect her as well as her personal reasons for staying in the 
relationship for any length of time.  However, a woman who is being 
persecuted by a family member on account of her membership in a 
particular social group defined by her defiance of the persecutor’s 
authority should not be denied asylum just because there was no valid 
marriage.  If the state is just as unwilling to protect an unmarried 
woman as it is a married woman, U.S. asylum law should not 
discriminate against unmarried women whose lives are in danger. 
Finally, the Department limited the effectiveness of its proposed 
social group by making the proposal dependent on the finalization of 
proposed regulations governing the adjudication of gender based 
claims.195  While admitting that the proposed regulations “do[] not 
address domestic violence per se,”196 the Department nevertheless 
                                                          
 195. Id. at 6. 
 196. Id. at 5. 
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“urge[d] the Attorney General to order the Board to grant asylum 
without an opinion, or to wait for promulgation of the final rule 
before deciding this case.”197  As discussed below, however, the 
regulations to which the Department of Homeland Security referred 
are not sufficient to protect battered women from adjudicators who 
are not familiar with the dynamics and the psychology of abusive 
relationships. 
D. The Department of Homeland Security’s 2009 Proposed Social Group:  
“Women Who Are Viewed as Property by Virtue of Their Positions Within a 
Domestic Relationship” 
In a promising development, the Department of Homeland 
Security under the Obama administration has articulated a favorable 
stance toward the asylum claims of domestic violence survivors— 
a stance even more accepting of battered women’s claims than that 
put forward in 2004.  In a brief for a case involving a Mexican 
domestic violence survivor,198 the Department posited two particular 
social groups under which domestic violence survivors may prove 
eligibility for asylum.  The first social group is similar to that which 
the Department put forward in Matter of R-A-, “women in domestic 
relationships who are unable to leave,”199 and thus suffers from the 
same flaw discussed above.  The second is “women who are viewed as 
property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.”200 
The second proposed social group does not contain the same basic 
flaw present in the first social group.  It does, however, present other 
concerns.  The first is that the social group relies entirely on the 
persecutor’s perception of the asylum applicant, a fact that may raise 
significant evidentiary problems for the applicant.  Unless an abuser 
specifically makes a statement or acts in a way that leads an 
adjudicator to find that the asylum applicant was viewed as property, 
                                                          
 197. Id. at 6.  The Department of Homeland Security also urged that the decision 
to grant asylum be “limited as much as possible to the particular facts of this case.”  
Id. at 4. 
 198. Department of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief at 14, Matter of L-R- 
(BIA Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter “DHS Brief 2009”], available at 
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/Redacted%20DHS%20brief%20on%20PSG.pdf.  
The Obama Administration also recently filed a brief in support of Rodi Alvarado’s 
asylum claim.  See Department of Homeland Security Response to the Resp’t’s 
Supplemental Filing of August 18, 2009, Matter of Rodi Alvarado-Pena (San Francisco 
Immigration Court, Oct. 28, 2009) (stating that the Department of Homeland 
Security “maintains that the respondent . . . is eligible for asylum and merits a grant 
of asylum as a matter of discretion”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
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the asylum claim may fail.  It is the burden of the asylum applicant to 
sustain her claim,201 and presenting testimony and other evidence 
sufficient to establish that the persecutor viewed her as property may 
prove difficult. 
The evidentiary issue raises a second concern, which is that the 
proposed social group relies on a subjective determination that the 
actions of the persecutor amount to viewing the asylum-seeker as 
property.  Some adjudicators may equate physical abuse, jealousy, 
possessiveness, and other abusive behavior with viewing the object of 
the abuse as property, but other adjudicators may not.  Such a 
subjective determination is not feasible in light of the fact that the 
asylum-seeker must prove that her membership in the social group 
was “one central reason” for the persecution she suffered.202  Even if 
the asylum applicant provides testimony and other evidence proving 
that her husband abused her, if the adjudicator does not believe that 
she was abused because of the central reason that the persecutor 
viewed her as property, the asylum claim may fail. 
Given these flaws in the proposed social groups, one cannot 
conclude that battered women’s asylum claims will necessarily find 
widespread acceptance.  Nevertheless, it is indeed promising that the 
Department of Homeland Security appears receptive to domestic 
violence-based asylum in the United States.  The social group posited 
below may prove effective in utilizing the Department’s willingness to 
recognize domestic violence as a basis for asylum. 
IV. NEW SOCIAL GROUP:  “WOMEN WHO HAVE FLED SEVERELY 
ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS” 
Refugee protection should be available to applicants who can 
prove that they have a well-founded fear of future persecution on 
account of their membership in the particular social group of 
“women who have fled severely abusive relationships.”  Such an 
individual possesses an immutable trait in that she has left the abusive 
relationship and has thereby irrevocably challenged the abuser’s 
power and control.  The applicant must prove that, if she is sent back 
to her country, there is at least a reasonable possibility that the abuser 
will find her and inflict even greater harm on her, or possibly even 
kill her, on account of her membership in the particular social group.  
She must prove that her government is unwilling or unable to protect 
                                                          
 201. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B). 
 202. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 
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her from the abuse.  If she proves these elements, the applicant 
possesses a well-founded fear of future persecution based on her 
membership in a valid social group, and qualifies for refugee 
protection. 
A. Past Persecution and Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution 
An applicant may establish a rebuttable presumption of future 
persecution if she suffered persecution in the past.203  An asylum 
applicant who has fled an abusive relationship may rely on past 
persecution if she had previously attempted to flee the relationship 
and consequently suffered separation violence at the hands of her 
abuser.204  Such past persecution would raise a rebuttable 
presumption that she will again suffer separation violence if she is 
sent back to her home country.205 
If the applicant had not previously fled the relationship, she must 
independently establish a well-founded fear of future persecution.   
In order to prove that her fear of persecution upon return is  
well-founded, she must prove that her subjective fear of future 
persecution is objectively reasonable by meeting the test set forth in 
Matter of Mogharrabi206 and discussed in Part II above:  (1) she must 
possess a characteristic or belief that the persecutor seeks to 
overcome by punishing her; (2) the persecutor must be aware or 
could become aware of the characteristic or belief; (3) the persecutor 
must be capable of punishing her; and (4) the persecutor must be 
inclined to punish her.207  The punishable characteristic is the 
applicant’s ability and willingness to challenge her abuser’s authority 
by leaving the relationship.  The persecutor becomes aware of this 
characteristic as soon as the applicant leaves the relationship.  The 
persecutor’s physical, mental, and emotional capability to inflict 
punishment is established by the abusive dynamics of the 
relationship.  The persecutor’s inclination to inflict punishment is 
also established by the abusive nature of the relationship as well as by 
the reality of separation violence.  The characteristic of being able 
and willing to leave the relationship also operates as the central 
reason for the persecution. 
                                                          
 203. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) & (2) (2009). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). 
 207. Id. at 446 (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 226 (BIA 1985)). 
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This leads to the inquiry of whether the persecution feared is based 
on a protected ground, namely, membership in a particular social 
group.  Here, the relevant analysis is whether the particular social 
group of “women who have fled abusive relationships” withstands the 
various restrictions governing social group formulations. 
B. Immutability of the Trait of Having Left an Abusive Relationship 
The most fundamental component of a valid social group is a 
characteristic or belief that a member cannot change, or one that is 
so fundamental to her identity that she should not be required to 
change it.208  Leaving an abusive relationship is an immutable 
characteristic.  The abused woman can return to the relationship 
voluntarily or forcibly, but she cannot change the fact that she took 
the actual step of leaving.  The psychology of abusive relationships is 
such that the abuser continues the physical and emotional abuse 
specifically to establish and maintain control over his partner, and to 
punish any challenge to that control.  Once a battered woman has 
left the relationship, she has irrevocably challenged her abuser’s 
power.  If she returns or is forcibly returned, she runs the risk of a 
significant increase in violence. 
If the abuser perceives the woman’s leaving as final, he may even 
go so far as to kill her.  His aim, again, is control.  Killing his intimate 
partner, who has defied him by leaving, is the ultimate exercise of 
control over his partner.209 
C. Flood of Battered Women? 
Introduction of the social group “women who have fled severely 
abusive relationships” might lead to concerns that a flood of battered 
women from around the world will seek refugee protection in the 
United States.  Although this is a practical rather than a legal 
question,210 given the fear of “opening the floodgates” to an 
overwhelming number of refugees by approving an overly broad 
social group, it is nevertheless an important consideration.211 
                                                          
 208. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
 209. WILSON & DALY, HOMICIDE, supra note 65, at 208. 
 210. There is nothing in the Refugee Convention or in U.S. asylum law that limits 
the number of asylum seekers who may receive asylum status in the United States. 
 211.  Compare Musalo, Floodgates, supra note 89, at 120 (discounting the fear of 
floodgates by emphasizing contrary historical trends and by addressing underlying 
causes of human rights violations rather than turning away victims), with Niang v. 
Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005) (“There may be understandable 
concern in using gender as a group-defining characteristic.  One may be reluctant to 
permit, for example, half a nation’s residents to obtain asylum on the ground that 
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In addressing the “floodgates” concern, it is important to recall 
that asylum is only available to “women who have fled severely abusive 
relationships” if the members of that particular social group also 
meet the other elements of the refugee definition.  Domestic 
violence occurs in the United States and other Western and 
developed countries, as well as across all ethnic and socioeconomic 
groups.  As discussed above, however, a member of this group must 
prove that her country does not have the resources or willingness to 
protect her from separation violence.  A citizen of a country that does 
have the resources and willingness to protect her would not meet the 
definition of a refugee and thus would not qualify for asylum in the 
United States. 
Even in cases involving countries that cannot or will not protect 
battered women, it is unlikely that battered women seeking asylum 
will overwhelm the United States in record-high numbers.  First, the 
unique dynamics of abusive relationships prevent many women from 
leaving their abusive relationships at all.  Second, even if a woman 
succeeds in breaking the Cycle of Violence and flees the abusive 
relationship, she may not necessarily desire to flee her country and 
family. 
As discussed above, the Cycle of Violence can be an extremely 
powerful barrier to a woman’s escape from an abusive relationship 
even in situations where support and resources are available.  
Possessiveness, isolation, and other controlling behavior masquerade 
as protectiveness and love; demeaning remarks and humiliating 
incidents shatter the victim’s self-esteem; threats to harm the victim 
or her children, or threats to self-inflict harm or commit suicide 
intimidate the victim; the threats escalate to beatings and other 
violent behavior that keeps the victim in a constant state of terror; 
and finally the calm respite brings back into focus the abusive 
behavior masquerading as affection.  In far too many cases, even in 
countries like the United States that provide resources and protection 
to battered women,  women are never fully able to break free of the 
Cycle of Violence. 
Even if a woman does manage to break free of the Cycle of 
Violence, this does not necessarily mean that she will take the drastic 
                                                          
women are persecuted there.”), and Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(dismissing the applicant’s assertion that “Iranian women, by virtue of their innate 
characteristic (their sex) and the harsh restrictions placed upon them, are a 
particular social group” by declaring that “this category is overbroad, because no 
factfinder could reasonably conclude that all Iranian women had a well-founded fear 
of persecution based solely on their gender”). 
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step of leaving her country to seek asylum abroad.  Fleeing to another 
country can be prohibitively expensive and risky.  This is especially 
true if the woman is unable to obtain a visa to enter a safe country 
legally and must rely on smugglers or other illegal channels to reach 
safety.  Fleeing to another country often requires leaving behind 
children and other loved ones, particularly if the woman needs to 
obtain the abuser’s permission to leave the country with their 
children. 
Battered women who manage to flee to the United States in order 
to seek asylum will thus have to have overcome two powerful 
obstacles:  (1) the strong emotional and psychological factors that 
compel battered women to remain with their abusers, and (2) the 
excruciating decision to leave behind their country and family.  The 
formidability of these obstacles minimizes the likelihood that a flood 
of battered women will descend upon the United States to seek 
asylum. 
The Board’s recognition of a social group based on vulnerability to 
another form of physical abuse, female genital mutilation (“FGM”), 
also called female genital cutting (“FGC”), met with similar fears, but 
a flood of FGM refugees has not materialized.  In Matter of Kasinga212 
(a misspelling of the applicant’s last name, Kassindja), the Board 
held that a young woman who feared being forced by her aunt and 
husband to undergo FGC was eligible for asylum.213  Karen Musalo 
has described the effects of the Kasinga decision as follows: 
[M]any who opposed a grant of asylum pointed to the fact that 
millions of women a year are subject to FGC [female genital 
cutting], and predicted that the U.S. would be overwhelmed with 
asylum seekers if it recognized fear of FGC as a basis of asylum.  
Fauziya Kassindja was granted asylum, but the dire predictions of a 
flood of women seeking asylum never materialized.  In fact an INS 
publication explicitly noted that “[a]lthough genital mutilation is 
practiced on many women around the world, INS has not seen an 
appreciable increase in the number of claims based on FGM” after 
the Kasinga decision.  In this same publication, INS stated that it 
did not expect to see a large number of claims if the U.S. 
recognized domestic violence as a basis of asylum.214 
The similarity between domestic violence and FGM is striking.  The 
oppression and manipulation of women in order to assure male 
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dominance and exploitation are common to both forms of 
persecution, as is the fact that both forms of persecution constitute 
severe bodily invasions.  One significant difference is that FGM may 
be perceived to be performed with benign intent,215 whereas domestic 
violence cannot, under any circumstances, be perceived as benign— 
a difference which only highlights the peculiar disparity in how the 
Board treats these two forms of gender-based persecution. 
Another important similarity between FGM and domestic violence 
is the degree of state complicity in, or helplessness to prevent, the 
persecution.  The cultural, religious, and social customs of a 
particular society influence governmental responses to FGM and 
domestic violence to a much greater degree than they do in other 
claims involving private actors.216  For example, a country may be 
beleaguered by drug cartels to such a degree that the government is 
unable to protect citizens who defy a powerful cartel.  In that 
situation, however, the cartel is viewed universally—by the 
government and by the citizens—as a plague on society.  In the 
situation of domestic violence, however, in countries unwilling or 
unable to protect its citizens from abusers, domestic violence is a 
long-existing, long-condoned means of maintaining what that society 
has long considered to be the proper order of society:  men as 
dominant and women as subordinate, particularly within the family.217 
In light of these striking similarities, the difference in the Board’s 
treatment of FGM claims versus domestic violence claims is 
unfathomable.  The Board’s fear that granting asylum to women who 
have fled severely abusive relationships will open the floodgates to 
                                                          
 215. See id. at 365 (affirming that “subjective ‘punitive’ or ‘malignant’ intent is not 
required for harm to constitute persecution”). 
 216. See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, Naturalism in International Adjudication, 18 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 395, 416 (2008).  Kelly argues, 
Even though female genital mutilation (FGM) or female circumcision may 
be abhorrent and injurious to health, it is not clear that it is a form of 
discrimination that violates the Convention when the participants (women 
and young girls) believe that this traditional practice is a constituent part of 
their culture. 
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284 (1997).  Obiora explains, 
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 217. See DHS Brief 2004, supra note 9, at 27 (acknowledging that Rodi Alvarado’s 
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vast numbers of individuals seeking asylum on the basis of improper 
grounds is unfounded at best and disingenuous at worst.  It again 
points to the deep misunderstanding of the psychology of domestic 
violence that led to the Matter of R-A- decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of R-A-, 
and the failure of the INS and its successor agency, the Citizenship 
and Immigration Services, to issue appropriate final regulations have 
resulted in an unconscionable delay of nearly ten years in the case of 
Rodi Alvarado and other survivors of severe domestic violence.  For 
many applicants, this delay has resulted in separation from their 
children and other loved ones, precarious immigration status, and 
the return of despondent applicants to countries where they face 
severe harm and even death at the hands of their abusers. 
The particular social group of “women who have fled severely 
abusive relationships” provides adjudicators with the key to ending 
this deplorable stalemate.  In light of the psychological realities of 
abusive relationships, the social group is sufficiently narrow.  It is 
comprised of women who possess the immutable characteristic of 
having irrevocably challenged the authority of their abusers.  
Although state action is not required for an applicant to meet the 
definition of a refugee, the persecution of the members of the 
particular social group carries with it the imprimatur of centuries of 
state-sponsored and society-sponsored male domination over women 
and the ongoing desire to preserve that dynamic.  It is therefore the 
legal obligation of the United States to provide asylum to members of 
the social group of “women who have fled severely abusive 
relationships.” 
